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THE SOUL—A STUDY OF PAST AND PRESENT BELIEFS.

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INTRODUCTION.

The selection of this subject¹ for investigation was not made with the view of settling any of the disputed points as to the nature of the soul, or even of raising the question as to whether man is endowed with a soul, but rather because the writer felt a lack of knowledge of the subject and has taken for granted that other students have the same feeling. As progress is made in any line of industry it is well to "take account of stock" at times and if the "assets" are sufficient the books may be closed, new accounts opened, and the stock increased. The results of this study may not justify the "closing of the books" but they may represent something of the "stock on hand." Students of psychology feel the lack of any definite understanding of the term "soul" as used by psychologists, compared with the meaning attached to it by the ministry. One object of the study is to present the views of these two professions. Another object is that, from the material presented, some definite understanding of the use of the term may at least be suggested. The subject is treated from the historical standpoint. The first section presents the ideas of primitive peoples. For the section on present ideas of the soul, the material of which was collected by means of a questionnaire, the writer desires to take this occa-

¹The writer desires to express his thanks to Dr. E. F. Buchner, of the University of Alabama, for suggesting the subject, and for valuable advice as to the method of arranging the material; to Dr. G. Stanley Hall and other members of Clark University for valuable suggestions.

sion to thank those who assisted him in collecting the data. The reader may be disappointed when he discovers that no very definite conclusions are reached. But it is hoped that the material will at least prove suggestive for future studies in psychology.

PRIMITIVE IDEAS OF THE SOUL.

A study of the beginning or origin of any mental trait or even of a social institution must deal more or less with the indefinite. Studies of existing savage and half-civilized races furnish certain data; to lower levels, or earlier stages of mankind we cannot go, and any reference to such state or condition is merely conjecture. The data presented in this study has been gathered from reports,¹ for the most part trustworthy. Yet we cannot vouch for the explanation given in all cases. To get at the real meaning of savage life, and to be able to properly interpret the beliefs of the savage, would imply in many cases long residence among these people. Perhaps too often, during the past, a hasty explanation has been given of what was thought to be understood. The savage does not clearly understand the reasons and causes for his own beliefs, his language is inadequate to give an accurate explanation. Educated people find it difficult to tell what they mean by soul; the savage no doubt experiences greater difficulty. He may not be able to think in abstract terms, or to conceive of an abstraction separate from an object. The psychology of the savage mind has not been sufficiently studied. He has no need for the shades of meaning expressed by various words in modern psychology. While the data given may not all be correct—much of it is, and as such is valuable as a basis for our study.

The first point that demands our attention is the state of mind of the savage. What conditions have given rise to any idea of the soul? Again, what are some of the explanations that have been offered to account for any idea of a soul, or how has the idea arisen?

As to the state of mind of the savage Lang offers the following:

¹ The principal data on the beliefs of primitive people are found in the following named works:

Primitive Culture, Tylor; Golden Bough, Fraser; *Psychologie der Naturvölker*, Robinsohn; *International Archiv für Ethnologie*, Vol. XIII, 1900; *Journal of American Folklore*; *Myths of the New World*, Brinton; *Native Races*, Bancroft; *Teutonic Myths*, Grimm, Vol. IV; *Popular Science Monthly*, Vol. XXXIV; *Sociology*, Vol. I, Spencer; *Descriptive Sociology*, 8 parts, Spencer; *Zeitschrift für Ethnologie*, *L'Anthropologie*; *Psyche*, *Rhode American Anthropologist*, *International Archiv für Ethnographie*, Supplement 1900, Bureau of Ethnology.

"We¹ set out to discover a stage of human intellectual development which would necessarily produce the essential elements of myth. We think we have found that stage in the condition of savagery.

"For the purposes of this inquiry, it is enough to select a few peculiarities of savage thought.

1. "First we have that nebulous and confused frame of mind to which all things, animate or inanimate, human, animal, vegetable, or inorganic, seem on the same level of life, passion or reason. The savage draws no hard and fast line between himself and the things in the world.

2. "The second point to note in savage opinion is the belief in magic and sorcery. The world and all the things in it, being vaguely conceived of as sensible and rational, obey the commands of certain members of the tribe, chiefs, jugglers, conjurors, or what you will.

3. "Another peculiarity of savage belief naturally connects itself with that which has just been described. The savage has very strong ideas about the persistent existence of the souls of the dead. They retain much of their own nature, but are often more malignant after death than they had been during life. They are frequently at the beck and call of the conjuror, whom they aid with their advice and with their magical power. By virtue of the close connection already spoken of between man and the animals, the souls of the dead are not rarely supposed to migrate into the bodies of the beasts, or to revert to the condition of that species of creatures with which each tribe supposes itself to be related by ties of kinship. With the usual inconsistency of mythical belief, the souls of the dead are spoken of, at other times, as if they inhabited a spiritual world, usually a gloomy place, which mortal man may visit, but whence no one can escape who has tasted of the food of ghosts.

4. "In connection with spirits a far-reaching savage philosophy prevails. It is not unusual to assign a ghost to all objects, animate or inanimate, and the spirit or strength of a man is frequently regarded as something separable, or something with a definite locality in the body. A man's strength and spirit may reside in his kidney fat, in his heart, in a lock of his hair, or may even be stored by him in some receptacle. Very frequently a man is held capable of detaching his soul from his body, and letting it roam about on business, sometimes in the form of a bird or other animal.

5 6. ". . . The savage, like the civilized man, is curious. The first faint impulses of the scientific impulses are at work in his brain; he is anxious to give himself an account of the

¹ A. Lang: *Mythology, Ritual and Religion*, Vol. I, pp. 48-51.

world in which he finds himself. But he is not more curious than he is, on occasion, credulous. His intellect is eager to ask questions, as is the habit of children, but his intellect is also lazy, and he is content with the first answer that comes to hand."

These are some of the conditions with which the intellect of the savage deals. He no doubt seeks the easiest means of explanation, and is satisfied for the time being.

Fraser¹ offers the following explanation:

"As the savage explains the processes of inanimate nature by supposing that they are produced by living beings working in or behind the phenomena, so he explains the phenomena of life itself. If an animal lives and moves it can only be, he thinks, because there is a little animal inside which moves it. If a man lives and moves, it can only be because he has a little man inside who moves him. The animal inside the animal, the man inside the man, is the soul." The activity of a man or animal is explained by the presence of the soul, sleep or death by its absence. Sleep and trance is the temporary, death the permanent absence of the soul.

Tylor² says the personal soul or spirit among lower races may be defined as follows: "It is a thin, unsubstantial human image, in its nature a sort of vapor, film or shadow; the cause of life and thought in the individual it animates; independently possessing the personal consciousness and volition of its corporeal owner, past or present; capable of leaving the body far behind, to flash swiftly from place to place, mostly impalpable and invisible, yet also manifesting physical power, and especially appearing to men waking or asleep as a phantasm separate from the body of which it bears the likeness; continuing to exist and appear to men after the death of that body; able to enter into, possess, and act in the bodies of other men, of animals, and even of things." This definition has wide application, is, in fact, a general definition, yet as one having universal significance it was not so claimed by the author.

This conception of the soul "preceded and led up to the more transcendental theory of the immaterial and immortal soul, which forms part of the theology of higher nations."³

Bancroft⁴ speaking of the native races of America says: "The most general idea of a soul seems to have been that of a double self, possessing all the essence and attributes of the individual, except the carnal embodiment, and independent of the body in so far as it was able to leave it and revel in other

¹ Fraser: *The Golden Bough*, Vol. I, p. 121.

² Tylor: *Primitive Culture*, Vol. I, p. 429.

³ Tylor: *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 24.

⁴ Bancroft: *Native Races*, Vol. III, p. 514.

scenes or spheres. It would accordingly appear to another person, by day or night, as a phantom, with recognizable form and features, and leave the impression of its visit in ideas, remembrances, or dreams."

But how dim or obscure this idea may be. Let us take for example the belief of the Ashantis. According to Müller¹ this tribe has a word *kla*, which means the life of man. If used as a masculine, it stands for the voice that tempts man to evil. If used in the feminine, it is the voice that persuades us to keep aloof from evil. Lastly, *kla* is a tutelary genius of a person who can be brought near by witchcraft, and expects sacrifices for the protection which he grants. When a man dies, his *kla* becomes *sis*a, and a *sis*a may be born again."

Or if we take another example, what do the Indians believe with regard to the soul?

An account of the Omaha Indian belief is given by Mr. La Flesche. He says there are a variety of beliefs concerning the immediate action of the spirit upon its withdrawal from the body. "Some think that the soul at once starts upon its journey to the spiritland; others, that it hovers about the grave as if reluctant to depart. Because of this latter belief, food and water are placed at the head of the grave for several days after the burial. The spirit is supposed to partake of this food. No Indian would touch any article of food thus exposed; if he did the ghost would snatch away the food and paralyze the mouth of the thief, and twist his face out of shape for the rest of his life; or else, he would be pursued by the ghost, and food would lose its taste, and hunger ever after haunt the offender." ²

The concept of immateriality, lacking content is as incomprehensible for the savage, says Schultz,³ as for the subtle metaphysician, who forms the immaterial concept but cannot demonstrate it. Because the human soul or spirit, as a picture, is not bound up in space and time. At death, it leaves the body quickly and is not seen; in the dream it is supposed to travel great distances with very great rapidity. These ideas early led to the conception, thinks Robinsohn, that the soul was fleeting, light, and movable in its nature, and that it had the form of an animal.

In the separate treatment of ghosts and spirits, especially in their connection with primitive man's ideas of the soul, no sharp lines can be drawn. It is, as Hartland says,—speaking of the lower stages of civilization, "No distinction is drawn between supernatural and spiritual beings who have never

¹ Max Müller: *Origin of Religion*, p. 112.

² La Flesche: *Journal of Folklore*, Vol. for 1889, p. 11.

³ Kosmos, III. Jahrg., 6 Bd. S. 327 (Robinsohn, *loc. cit.*, p. 37 quoted), *ibid.* p. 37.

been enclosed in human bodies, and the spirits of the dead. Savage philosophy mingles them together in one phantasmagoria of grotesquery and horror. The line which separates fairies and ogres from the souls of men has gradually grown up through ages of Christian teaching; and broad as it may seem to us, it is occasionally hardly visible in these stories."¹

Robinsohn in his *Psychologie der Naturvölker*,² thinks that the sight of the dead has influenced savage belief.

As the naïve savage mind viewed his dead relative, who a short time before spoke and moved freely, he must, involuntarily, have come to the conclusion that something had left the body; and that something we call the soul. Thus the significance of death was explained and the soul discovered. But in arriving at the idea of soul, first he considered the dream as a real occurrence, and then from the facts of the dream, he concluded that he is a double being, a synthesis of body and that part of him that made journeys and gained new experiences while he slept. The soul is³ assumed, among many peoples, to have animal form. This notion has probably grown out of the fact that during the dream period the soul is supposed to travel over great distances in a moment's time. The savage hunter knows that many animals and especially birds have this swiftness of movement, so by analogy he concludes that the soul must have a like means of travel. Of the different forms which are sometimes ascribed to the soul, the human form is the one most often given. The savage is led to this conclusion, Robinsohn thinks, partly by the effect of the dream, but more impressively by the shadow itself. Why he fixes upon the shadow is because it has the contour of the body, is intangible, and disappears on the approach of darkness. The fact that there are some peoples, as the Abipone Indians for instance, who do not comprehend the meaning of death,—that is, that it is the end of corporeal existence—but do know of dreams, has led Mr. Robinsohn to lay great stress on the dream as being the true inlet of the belief in a soul. Bordeaux⁴ bases very much on the dream. He points out the influence of the dream on our philosophical system, contending that metaphysics and the entire transcendental world has been built up on the basis of the belief in dreams. The resemblance of death to sleep, not easily distinguishable even by civilized peoples at times; the dream as a reality, a part of the body independent at times; these form a substantial basis of belief in an unseen image of the individual, or soul, for the savage. They form a basis for

¹Hartland: *The Science of Fairy Tales*, p. 43.

²*Psychologie der Naturvölker*, p. 2.

³*Ibid.*, p. 7.

⁴*Problème de la Mort*.

another world, that of spirit and thought, which civilized man has tried so often to describe and explain.

Spencer¹ thinks that "dream-experiences necessarily precede the conception of a mental self; and are the experiences out of which the conception of a mental self eventually grows."

These ideas, as expressed by different students of the subject, while they are not stated as scientific facts, are merely satisfactory or plausible explanations.

The dream is the most influential factor, because the experiences of dream life seem real, and to the savage may seem an actual experience. Then the shadow had contributed an idea of form, the breath some idea of color or tangibility. But underlying all these—the one mystery that has given vitality and served to perpetuate these ideas is that of death.

THE WORD "SOUL."

Let us turn to the word "soul" and study its meaning as expressed by various peoples. An analogous comparison is usually made of what the savage regards as the soul with the function of some organ of the body. The shade of meaning expressed depends on the organ or function with which it is compared.

The data, however, is valuable in getting at the actual facts of belief.

Some words used for "soul" by various tribes, and their synonymous meanings are as follows:

Iroquois. Eri or eriasā, or aweriasā—the soul; the heart; and the mind, considered as the seat of sentiment.

Mohawk. Atouritz—Soul; atourion—to breathe (derived from same root).

Algonquin. Tchuk, or Otachuk—Soul, shadow.

Abipones. Loàkal—Shadow, soul, echo, picture.

Aztec. Ehekatl—wind, shadow, soul.

Zulu (Negro). Isi-tunzi—soul, shadow.

Bechuana (Negro). Isi-tunzi—soul, shadow.

Papuan. Geist (not aboriginal with them)—soul, steam, fog.

West Australian. Wang—breath, spirit, soul.

Negroes of West Coast Africa. The soul usually called "kra," is a guardian spirit that lives in the man. The immortal part is the man himself in a shadowy or ghostly form, called *srahman* (Sunsum—Spirit and shadow).

Java. Nava—breath, life, soul.

Tasmanian. Warrawah—shade, shadow, ghost or apparition.

Karens. Lá—soul, ghost or genius.

Carib. Iouanni—soul, life, heart.

Old Calabar. Ukpon—soul, shadow.

Basutos (Negro). Seriti—shadow, or spirit remaining after death.

Arawak (Indians). Ueja—shadow, soul, or image.

Quiché (Indians). Natub—shadow, soul.

Netela (Language of Cal.) Piuts—life, breath, soul.

¹Sociology, Vol. I, p. 157.

- Basque. Arima—Soul, astoarin arima—butterfly.
 Eskimo. Silla—air, wind, world, mind.
 Gypsies. Dūk—breath, spirit, ghost.
 Arabic. Ruh—breath, spirit.
 Sanscrit. Atman—Soul, spirit, breath, sun, fire.
 Gothic. Saivala—Soul, the word related to *saivs* which means the sea, from the root *si* or *siv*—to shake. The soul is conceived by the Teutons as a sea within, heaving up and down.
 Hebrew. Nephesh—breath, life, soul, mind, animal; Ruach and Neshamah—breath, spirit.
 Greek. Thymos—soul, from *thyein*—to rush, or move violently.
 Romans. Latin (Cicero). Animus—mind, from *anima*—air, soul. (From the latter word we have animal.) *Anima* comes from root *an*—to blow. In Sanscrit, anila—wind; in Greek, anemos—wind.

EUROPEAN WORDS FOR SOUL.

| | |
|--------------------------|--------------------|
| Old High German—Sêola. | Slavonian—Duzha. |
| Middle High German—Sêle. | Bohemian—Duse. |
| New High German—Seele. | Polish—Dusza. |
| Anglo-Saxon—Sáwl. | Lithuanian—Duszia. |
| Old Norse—Sál | Litt—Dwehsele. |
| | (Psyche). |
| Swedish—Själ. | Greek—(ψυχή) |
| Danish—Sjæl. | Latin—Anima. |
| Finn—Sielu. | Italian—Anima. |
| Russian—Dusha. | French—âme. |
| Servian—Dusha. | Old French—arme. |

Spanish—Alma.

These words are all feminine gender, and, as Grimm¹ points out, distinguish this conception of the soul from the masculine breath and spirit.

In the German language we have the terms “geist” and “seele” for which the following explanation has been given.²

The words “geist” and “seele” (spirit and soul) are among those; the derivation of which is not yet satisfactorily ascertained.

“In the word ‘geist,’ it does not assist us much to refer to the older forms accessible to us. The Gothic does not possess the word, at least so far as our sources reach; rather the Gothic translates the Greek ‘*pneuma*’ by ‘*ahma*.’ The Anglo-Saxon has the word in the form of ‘gast;’ in the old Saxon it appears as ‘gest;’ and even in the old High German it reaches far back in the forms ‘geist’ and ‘keist.’ On the other hand, again, it is wanting in the old northern, which reproduces the idea of ‘pneuma,’ ‘*spiritus*, in the word ‘andi’ (masc). But even this ‘andi’ does not occur in the rythmical Edda, and seems generally only to be used in prose, and in such poems as bear a distinctly Christian character. All the forms in

¹Teutonic Myth, Vol. II, p. 826.

²R. von Raumer, on *Geist* and *Seele*, “referred to the fundamental idea of their Germanic appellations,” in Delitzsch, “System of Biblical Psychology,” trans. 1890, Edinburgh.

which the older Germanic languages present the word '*geist*,' testify (1) that the initial sound is a mute in the Gothic degree of sound '*g*;' (2) that the vowel of the word (High German '*ei*,' Anglo-Saxon '*a*,' old Saxon '*e*') correspond to the Gothic '*ai*.' Hence it follows that the derivation of the word '*Geist*' from the old High German '*jesan*' (*fermentescere*, to ferment) is untenable. Grimm (*Gramm.* ii. 46) traces '*geist*' back to the root '*geisan*,' '*gais*,' '*gisun*' (*ferire*), but this root itself is only assumed to exist. There remains, therefore, nothing to do but to bring together the words of the Germanic languages whose sound accords with '*geist*,' and whose import points to a connection with this word. In a peculiar manner the two old Germanic languages from which the word '*geist*' proceeds, actually present some words which probably lead us to the fundamental idea of the word. The old-northern has a trace of a word '*geisa*'—*cum impetu ferri, cito cursu ferri, ruere*. But the Gothic renders εἰσβάλλει Mark iii, 21 by *usgaijan*; Luke ii, 47, and elsewhere εἰσβάλλει by '*usgaisnan*.' We should thus be led to suppose that the idea lying at the root of the word '*geist*' is that of quick, hasty movement. The old-northern substantive *ódr* (*Völuspa* 18), spirit, offers an analogy with this ideal affinity in its reference to the adjective *ódr*, rash, impetuous, fierce, and to its root, *vada præst*: *od*, to go along eagerly, with force.

"The word '*seele*' (soul), Gothic '*saivala*,' seems to be connected with the Gothic '*saivs*' (late High German, '*See*'); and the connecting idea appears, in like manner, to be that of movement, although of a gentler kind. The word '*seele*' occurs in the Gothic ('*saivala*') old High German ('*sêla*'). Anglo-Saxon ('*sávvul*'), '*sávl*,' '*saul*'), old Saxon ('*sêola*,' '*siola*'). On the other hand, the word does not seem to have appeared in the old-northern until the period of Christianity. In the whole rhythmic Edda, only the distinctly Christian '*Solarliod*' contain it. We have the original psychological mode of expression of the north German in '*Völuspa*' 18, where *ódr* is interchangeable with '*geist*,' and *ond* with *seele*, without, however, implying that by these ideas are hidden there in all their meaning and extent. At all events, it looks as if Christianity had been the first means of representing the *ódr* of the Edda as '*andi*,' the '*önd*' of the Edda as '*sál*.' The Icelandic translation of the New Testament (Kaupmannahaufn, 1807) renders '*pneuma*,' by '*ande*,' '*psuché*' by '*sal*.' There needs still further investigation to tell us how far, in the other Germanic languages also, the promulgation of the words '*geist*' and '*sêle*' might be associated with the introduction of Christianity."

THE INFLUENCE OF DREAMS.

Some writers, as above noted, think that the dream alone has given rise to our idea of the soul. Civilized man has passed far beyond this state of mind. The educated person rarely connects the dream with his idea of soul, or is it associated with his religion. But how is it with the child? And what has it meant for the savage?

Spencer¹ notes that "hunger and repletion, both very common with the primitive man, excite dreams of great vividness. Now, after a bootless chase and a long fast, he lies exhausted; and, while slumbering, goes through a successful hunt,—kills, skins and cooks his prey; and suddenly awakens when about to take the first morsel. To suppose him saying to himself, 'It was a dream,' is to suppose him already in possession of that hypothesis which we see he cannot have. He takes the facts as they occur." That is, as he further states, another part, his other self has experienced these things, while his body has remained at rest. This is without doubt a correct interpretation, and such an experience would greatly influence the savage.

"He knows nothing² of sensations and ideas—has no words for them. Still less has he any such highly abstract word or conception as consciousness. He does not think about thought; neither do his faculties suffice for this. During early stages he merely thinks without observing what he thinks; and therefore never asks how he thinks, and what it is which thinks. His senses make him conversant only with things externally existing, and with his own body." Mr. Spencer thinks that the savage thus takes the dream psychoses as they occur, as facts, and for no other reason than that he lives and acts in the external world, that of sensation, and has no concept of mind or dream. He cites examples of the poverty of aboriginal languages as a further proof that psychoses are all alike considered real. Since the savage considers the dream as an actual experience, then the idea of a dual existence, *i. e.*, of being in two places at the same time is inevitable.

The Indians of South America in order to produce the state of the dream, which is considered by them a reality and during which many wonderful achievements are executed, use poison as a narcotic. Among the Schingu Indians as Schmeltz³ relates, the medicine-men kill themselves with the poisonous drug in order, as they think, to change the human form into

¹ Spencer: Prin. of Sociology, p. 148.

² Spencer: Sociology, Vol. I, p. 146.

³ International Archiv für Ethnologie, Vol. XIII. Beliefs of the South Amer. Indians.

that of the shadow or soul without the body. This use of the narcotic is one of the devices which the medicine-man employs against the superstitions of his tribe. Death itself, says Schmeltz,¹ is regarded as a narcotic effect of some kind in the body, causing the shadow to be separated from it, never to return to awaken the sleeper.

The idea of the soul as related especially to the dream among different tribes is as follows:

Schingu Ind. (S. Amer.). They believe that experience in dreams is reality, and that while the body is in the hammock they are still able during the dream to hunt, fish and fell trees.

Iroquois. The rational soul was believed to visit the objects thought of in the dream, while the bodily soul remained.

Negroes of West Coast Africa. Dreams are regarded as the adventures of the "Kra." Sickness occurs only during its absence.

Bakairi (S. Amer.). The shadow is believed to wander about during sleep. It is dangerous to waken a person during its absence and its search to return to the body causes headache at night.

Paressi (S. Amer.). Have an idea regarding the soul similar to the above mentioned belief. The soul, or shadow, is called "Niako." It leaves the body at the neck and a ringing in the ears denotes its return.

Bororó (S. Amer.). Believe the dream to be a reality and try to induce it as a means of communication. The soul, "bupe," leaves the body of the sleeper in the form of a bird. It experiences many things on its journey and what it relates is regarded as the absolute basis of truth.

Karaya (S. Amer.). The spirit is thought to leave the sleeping body in order to ramble about and hold intercourse with other persons or spirits.

New Zealander. During sleep the mind or soul is believed to leave the body to hold converse with friends. The facts and adventures of dream are the objects seen during its wanderings.

Tagals (Luzon). The soul leaves the body during sleep. It is considered dangerous to waken a person during its absence.

Greenlander. Certain of these people believe that the soul quits the body during sleep, and goes hunting, visiting, etc.

Fiji. The spirit of a living man is said to leave the body in order to trouble other persons when asleep.

Dyaks (Borneo). The dream represents the actual experiences of the soul which is supposed to go on expeditions of its own during sleep. It is said to see, hear, and talk in its meanderings.

Karens (India). During sleep the lá, or spirit, is believed to wander to the ends of the earth; our dreams consist of the things the soul, or lá, sees and experiences on its journey.

Peruvian. Believe that the soul leaves the body while it is sleeping, and what we dream are things seen in its wanderings. The soul cannot sleep.

Japanese. ¹If a sleeper is awakened suddenly and violently, he is sure to die, because his soul is rambling. The soul is supposed to have form and color, and to be a small, round, black body. Its adventures furnish material for imaginative literature.

Chinese.² The soul is thought to travel during sleep. The spiritual

¹Int. Arch. für Eth. Vol. XIII. Beliefs of the South Amer. Ind., p. 5, *ibid.* 6.

¹ and ²Oakes: Popular Science Monthly, Vol. XXXIV.

man, or soul, of Tih Kwalee, one of the gentry, was on a voyage, so the story goes, and a wild beast ate the body during its absence. On its return the spirit, finding only the skeleton of the man, entered the corpse of a black lame beggar near by and always afterwards walked with a staff.

Burmese. It is believed that the *Leip-bya* (butterfly spirit), wanders during sleep. Its encounters are considered to be the explanation of dreams. Sickness is thought to be due to some misfortune befalling it on one of these excursions.

Celts. The old belief is that the soul wanders from the body at times. It is related of two young men that while sitting on the bank of a cascade, one of them fell asleep; the other, seeing issue from his mouth an indistinct form no larger than a humble-bee, tried to waken him, but before he succeeded the cloud-like creature returned, and the young man awoke and related a wonderful dream.

Buriat. The soul is believed to quit the body during sleep. It visits the spirits and remembers its experiences.

Vedanta (philosophy). In deep sleep the soul separates itself from the body and remains with God or the world-soul during the slumber.

A different idea, emphasizing another side of dream life, is brought out by the savage when he proclaims that he has been visited during the dream by some one in spirit. In addition to the idea that the soul departs during sleep the Indians held this conception of the dream. They believed that the personages met in the dream were real and must be obeyed.

Sandwich Islanders. Departed members of the family sometimes appear in a dream to the survivors, and watch over their resting.

Malagasy. The good demon comes to tell them in their dreams when they ought to do a thing, and to warn them of some dream.

Africa, Congo People. Think that the things they see and hear in dreams come to them from spirits.

Wanika (E. Africa). Believe that the spirits of the dead appear to the living in dreams.

Kaffirs. Ascribe dreams in general to spirits.

Zulu. Two views are held: (1) The individual may be visited in a dream by the shade of an ancestor, the *itongo*, to warn him of danger; (2) he may be taken by the *itongo* to visit distant scenes.

Indians. Two ideas prevail: (1) Either a soul from without visits the sleeper; (2) or, the rational soul goes on an excursion during sleep, while the sensitive soul remains with the body.

Fijian. The spirit of another person is believed to come to visit him during sleep.

Indian of Brit. Columbia. Believes that the spirit of another comes to visit him in a dream.

Negroes of South Guinea. Dreams are thought to be the visits of the spirits of deceased friends.

Ancient Greeks. Believed that the dream-soul is a visitor from the dead. Achilles was visited by the soul of Patroclus. Homer *I*, LXXIII, 59.

Romans (Cicero). Dreams are both phantoms of the living and ghosts of the dead. *De Divinatione* I, 27.

THE SOUL AS AN ANIMATE FORM.

The most common attribute of the soul, if we may so speak of it, is that of animate form; the soul being represented as some animal. As will be seen in the list of animals noted be-

low, the serpent and bird are frequently used, and again the butterfly. In regard to the bird, Brinton¹ suggests that "it has the incomprehensible power of flight; it floats in the atmosphere, it rides on the winds, it soars toward heaven where dwell the gods; its plumage is stained with the hues of the rainbow and the sunset; its song was man's first hint of music; it spurns the clods that impede his footsteps, and flies proudly over the mountains and moors where he toils wearily along. He sees no more enviable creature; he conceives the gods and angels must also have wings; and pleases himself with the fancy that he, too, some day will shake off this coil of clay, and rise on pinions to the heavenly mansions. All living beings, say the Eskimos, have the faculty of soul, but especially the birds."

Since to the Indian, says Schmeltz,² incorporeality of soul is not to be comprehended, and because the spirit of the dead appears in human form, that is, as shadow, he always identifies body and spirit and ascribes to spirits or ghosts of deceased persons the same activities, needs and cares that belong to the living.

Birds.

Because of some fanciful resemblances, perhaps, as suggested by Brinton, many tribes have associated the soul with birds.

Icannas (Ind. S. A.). The souls of the brave were believed to travel in beautiful birds and to eat luscious fruit, while those of cowards became reptiles.

Kailta (Ind. Cal.). When a person dies a little bird is thought to fly away with his soul to the spirit-land. If he was a bad Indian, a hawk catches the little bird and devours it, feathers and soul.

Bororó (S. A. Ind.). During a dream the soul is thought to travel in the shape of some bird, and at death to be changed into a red Arara.

Makusi (S. A. Ind.). The cry of a nocturnal bird, the goat-sucker, is believed to be that of a spirit in the form of a bird.

Powhatan (Ind.). A certain little woodbird was supposed to be the soul of the dead chieftains of this tribe. Great care was taken not to harm this bird.

Hurons (Ind.). After the burial of the bones at the feast of the dead, the soul is thought to pass into the form of a turtle-dove. This is also the belief of the Iroquois Indians.

Caribs (Ind.). The bat is thought to be a departed spirit.

Algonquin (Ind.). There is thought to be two souls; the animate soul, which departs from the corpse in the shape of a dove, and the physical, which enters into another human being.

Finns. The Milky Way was called the Birds' Way, or the way of souls. The Lithuanians, and nearly all Indo-European peoples, had similar sayings.

¹ Myths of the New World, p. 123.

² Beliefs of the South Amer. Indians. Inter. Arch. für Eth., Vol. XIII, p. 10.

Bohemians. The heathen Bohemians thought that the souls of the dying flew out of their mouths in the shape of birds.

Celebes. The soul is conceived of as having the form of some bird. It is thought that the bridegroom's soul is liable to fly away at marriage, so colored rice is scattered over him to induce it to stay.

Servians. The soul is represented as an aerial or bird-shaped substance, which escapes from the body at death and, like a timid bird, flits from tree to tree until the burial. It is often transformed into a cuckoo.

China. After twenty-one days of mourning for the dead, paper storks are placed on poles in front of the house that they may carry the soul of the departed one to paradise.

Egyptians. One part of the soul, the "ba," was represented as a bird with human head and hands.

Moslems. The souls of the faithful are believed to assume the form of snow-white birds and to nestle under the throne of Allah between death and the resurrection.

Saxons. Many Saxons represent the soul as a dove which ascends to heaven, or as a humming-bird which goes to heaven after twenty-four hours.

Romans. The myth of Aristeas, as related by Pliny,¹ represents the soul of the dying man as issuing from his mouth in the form of a raven.

Latin. When a ship founders, those on shore are said to observe the souls of the drowned to fly upward as white doves.

²It is a graceful fancy which makes the departing soul either break into a blossom as a flower, or fly upward as a bird.

After Sankara³ had destroyed the Buddhists in India to prove his supernatural powers to the Grand Lama, he soared into the air, but the Grand Lama perceiving his shadow, as he mounted up, struck his knife into it and down fell the Sankara and broke his neck.

Schmeltz⁴ thinks that in accounting for the fact that the soul is supposed to take the form of a bird, or to pass into one, there is to be considered, besides the idea of rapid flight, the lamenting cries of some birds in the night time. These strike terror to the savage and lead him to imagine an imprisoned soul that longs to be back with its friends.

Butterfly.

Nicaraguan (Ind.). The soul of the man, called "Yulio," is believed to separate itself at death and become a wavy, flying substance. It issues from the mouth and looks somewhat like the person.

Karens. The soul is conceived of in the form of a butterfly.

Servians. ⁵Believe that the soul of a sleeping witch often leaves her body in the form of a butterfly. If, while it is absent, her body is turned around and her feet placed where her head was before, the soul will not find its way back into the body and the woman will die.

¹Pliny: Nat. Hist., VII, Sec. 174.

²Grimm: Teutonic Myth., Vol. II, p. 826.

³Frazer: *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 142.

⁴Beliefs of the South Amer. Ind., Inter. Archiv für Ethnog., Vol. XIII, p. 14.

⁵Frazer: I, 127.

Burmese. The immortal soul is called *Leip-bya*, meaning butterfly or spirit.

¹Among the Burmese, when the mother dies leaving a young baby, it is thought that the "butterfly," or soul of the baby follows that of the mother and if it is not recovered, the child will die. A wise woman is called to bring back the child's soul. She allures it back by means of a mirror held near the corpse. On the mirror is placed a piece of feathery cotton-down. She then entreats the mother not to take the soul of the child with her, meanwhile catching up the down with a cloth and placing it on the baby's breast.

Irish. The uneducated peasantry regard the pure white butterfly to be the soul of the sinless and forgiven dead on the way to paradise; the spotted ones, condemned souls on the way to purgatory, the spots corresponding to the number of sins.

Italy. A butterfly flitting around a baby's cradle is believed to be either an angel's or a baby's soul.

Russians. When the soul escapes from the body, according to folk-tales, it is sometimes represented as a little bird, or butterfly, and sometimes as a miniature human form.

Christianity. Angels are represented as having wings. *Psyche* is shown as a butterfly on the open hand, or at least, with wings.

Mouse, etc.

Mohaves (Ind.). The soul is believed to rise as the smoke of the funeral pyre curls upward. If the soul is impure from crime or stained with human blood, it is transformed into a rat and must remain four days in a rat-hole to be purified.

Swabian belief. A story relates that a girl's soul creeps out of her mouth in the form of a white mouse.

German (legends and myths). The mouse is symbolic of the soul. A little red mouse is sometimes said to issue from the mouth of the sleeper as the departing soul or spirit.

Russians. The peasants often speak of the Milky Way as the *Mouse-path*, the mouse being a well-known figure of the soul.

The prevalence of the belief, so common in European folklore, that the mouse represents the soul, has led Mr. Conway² to formulate the theory that the shudder which some nervous people feel at the sight of even a harmless mouse, is a survival of the time when it was believed that in this form unshriven souls, or those of unbaptized children, haunted their former homes.

Serpent.

Kaffir. When a Kaffir sees a serpent in his dwelling, he thinks that the soul of some dead person has returned for revenge.

Zulus. The incarnated spirit is called "*Ihlozi*." If a serpent is seen on the grave, the *Ihlozi* is believed to have taken up its abode.

Arabs. The serpent is believed to be no ordinary creature, but a "*deschim*," a spirit. Mohammed recognized good and evil spirits in the serpent.

German (Myth.). The soul was seen to come from the mouth of King Gunthrum in the form of a little serpent.

¹ Frazer: I, p. 130.

² Demonology and Devil Lore, Vol. I, p. 128.

Lizards.

The Santals¹ believe the soul to have the form of a lizard, and relate how on one occasion it left the body, while the owner was asleep, and entered a pitcher of water to drink. Just then the owner of the pitcher covered it, the soul did not return to the body and the man died. But while they were preparing to burn the body, some one uncovered the pitcher—the soul escaped, returned to the body and the man revived.

Among the Netherlandish peoples, in the stories of King Gunthrum, the soul is depicted as issuing from his mouth in the form of a small reptile.

Fish and other Animals.

Kaffirs. Fish are not eaten because they are believed to embody souls.

East Brazil (Ind.). The soul is thought to pass into the fish that are placed on the grave and it is in this way protected.

Nias. The heart soul (Noso dodo) is believed to survive after death in the form of a spider.

Kainguá (Ind. S. A.). It was thought that a tiger which roamed about in the vicinity of a burial ground was the changed form of a recently buried person.

Buriat. The soul is believed to take the form of a bee.

Goyatacas (Brazil Ind.). This tribe believes in the immortality of the soul. The soul is thought to wander for a time in the body of a cow.

In Transylvania² it was reported at the trial of a witch, that the woman, together with two men who were employed by her in a vineyard, lay down at noon to rest. She failed to awake at once. A large fly was seen buzzing around. This was caught by one of the men and put into his leather bag. For some time they were unable to waken the woman. Later, however, the fly being released flew directly into her mouth and she awoke. They then knew that she was a witch.

Frazer³ relates the incident of a Melanesian woman who, knowing that a neighbor was at the point of death, heard a rustling in her house as of a moth fluttering. The lamentation told her at the same instant that the soul had flown. She caught the fluttering thing, ran with it and held it above the open mouth of the corpse; but it failed to revive.

The natives of the Danger Islands⁴ of the South Pacific believe in different sizes of the soul. The sorcerers set snares of different sizes of stout sennit, fifteen to thirty feet long, with loops on either side to suit the size of the different souls. For fat souls there are large loops, for thin souls small ones. This

¹ Frazer : I, 126.

² Frazer : Vol. I, p. 126.

³ The Golden Bough, Vol. I, p. 136.

⁴ Gill : Myths and Songs of the South Pacific, p. 171

method was employed by the sorcerers against persons towards whom they bore ill-will, and accordingly when a man was sick these soul-snares were set up in the trees near his house. The soul might be caught in the shape of a bird or insect, and if so, the man infallibly died.

These various associations of the soul with different forms of animal life, as expressed above, from one standpoint suggest something of the pathetic. Realizing that, physically, they cannot accomplish, or reach a certain ideal they have in mind, the savage imagines, with child-like simplicity, that the fulfillment of these ideals will be attained by means of increased powers. He could satisfy many of his longings if he were only able to accomplish certain things that animals can do so easily.

THE SHADOW.

What has been the influence of the shadow on the minds of primitive peoples? Has it contributed to the idea of the soul? We cannot but think it has influenced their idea of form. Many primitive peoples say that the soul is a shadow. What do they mean? Max Müller¹ says:

"I do not in the least believe they think the shadow a soul, or the soul a shadow; but they use the word shadow figuratively for that belonging to man, which is like his shadow, definitely individual, and inseparable from him, but unsubstantial. The Mota word we use for soul is in Maori a shadow, but no Mota man knows that it ever means that. In fact, my belief is, that in the original language this word did not definitely mean either soul or shadow, but had a meaning one can conceive but not express, which has come out in one language as meaning shadow, and in the other as meaning something like soul, *i. e.*, second self."

"What we must try to understand is exactly this transition of meaning, how from the observation of the shadow which stays with us by day and seems to leave us by night, the idea of a second self arose; how that idea was united with another, namely that of breath, which stays with us during life, and seems to leave us at the moment of death; and how out of these two ideas the concept of a something, separate from the body and yet endowed with life, was slowly elaborated. Here we can watch a real transition from the visible to the invisible, from the material to the immaterial; but instead of saying that people in that primitive stage of thought, believe their souls to be shadows, all we should be justified in saying would be that they believed that, after death, their breath, having left the body, would reside in something like the shadow that follows

¹ Max Müller: *Origin of Religion*, p. 86.

them during life. The superstition that a dead body casts no shadow, follows very naturally from this."

The shadow has a certain form, or outline, and is intangible; when the savage says that his soul is a shadow it may be only a comparison.

It is the constant attendant of man during sunshine and pictures him in outline. Brinton notes,¹ "it is of a nature akin to darkness, earth and night."

Schmeltz states that, when the South American Indian wishes to represent the spirit of the deceased, he always gives it the human form. He also calls attention to the part memory plays in this case,—that is, that all phenomena are memory pictures.

If the shadow was not equivalent to the soul, it was, as Frazer² thinks, at least regarded as a living part of the man, so that injury done to the shadow was felt by the person or animal just as if it had been done to the body. Ideas expressed among different tribes are as follows:

Zulu (Negro). The soul is thought to be a shadow, having the shape of the body.

Bechuana (Negro). The soul is conceived of as a shadow with human form.

Benin (Negro). They regard their shadows as their souls.

African (other Negro Tribes). It is believed that a man's shadow or shade is intimately connected with his soul, the departed soul of a person being called his shadow or shade. The world of shades is in the region below.

Ojibways. It is described by these people how one of their chiefs died, and while they were watching the body on the third night, his shadow came back into it. The man sat up and then told them how he had travelled to the river of death but had been sent back to his people.

Arawak (Ind.). The word "neja" equals shadow, soul, picture.

Abipones (Ind.). Loákal equals shadow, soul, echo, picture.

Mohave (Ind.). The soul is called shadow. "When a Mojave dies he goes to another country just like his own; it is the shadow of his own country, the shadows of its rivers, mountains, valleys, and springs, in which his own shadow is to stay."

³The demons of the Barbar Islands get power over a man's soul by holding fast his shadow or by striking or wounding it.

The Magicians of the Islands of Wetar, of the South Pacific, can make a man ill by stabbing his shadow with a spike, or cutting it with a sword.

Greeks (Homer). Odysseus recognized many heroes in the underworld as shadows. Among them was his mother; but when he went to embrace her she warned him that she was only a shadow.

REFLECTION.

While some peoples identify soul with shadow, others believe

¹ *Myths of the New World*, p. 273.

² Frazer: *The Golden Bough*, I, p. 143.

³ Frazer: I, p. 142.

a man's soul to be in his reflection as seen in water or in a mirror. Frazer¹ has collected considerable data on this conception of the soul.

The Andamanese Islanders think that the reflection seen in a mirror is the soul, while the Fijians believe man to have two souls, a light one and a dark one. The light one is his reflection in water or in a mirror, the dark one his ordinary shadow. The latter goes to Hades. The Zulus will not look into a dark pool because they imagine there is a beast in it that will take away their reflection, causing them to die.

The Basutos of Africa think that crocodiles have the power of killing a man by dragging his reflection under water.

Among the Melanesians, it is believed that if a man looks into a certain pool the malignant spirits get hold of his reflection. If he even glances into it he will die.

According to the ancient Greek idea, to dream of seeing one's self reflected in the water was an omen of death, and Frazer² thinks that this is the origin of the story of Narcissus, who, having seen his reflection in the water, pined and died.

PORTRAITS.

The peoples who believe that their soul resides in the shadow or reflection, have a horror of portraits. "For if the portrait," says Frazer³, "is the soul, or at least a vital part of the person portrayed, whoever possesses the portrait will be able to exercise a fatal influence over the original of it." He mentions some instances of this belief that have been noted. The Canelos Indians of South America think that the soul is carried away in the picture, and it is related that two of them, having been photographed, actually came back the next day to ask if their souls had been taken away. Some of the Wa-teita in Eastern Africa thought they would be entirely at the mercy of the photographer, and the Mandans imagined that they would soon die if their portraits were in the hands of another. Frazer⁴ notes that the superstition still exists in various parts of Europe, and it is said that they sometimes pine away and die after being photographed. Some old women of the Greek Islands are thought to have died from this cause, with others perhaps it may prove unlucky, as some of the people in the west of Scotland to-day imagine.

Among the Ainus⁵ to speak of the form of a person is equivalent to speaking of his soul, spirit, or ghost. Outlining the

¹ Frazer: *The Golden Bough*, Vol. I, pp. 145-148.

² Vol. I, p. 146.

³ *The Golden Bough*, Vol. I, p. 148.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 149.

⁵ *Journal of Amer. Folklore*, 1894, p. 43.

form on paper was thought to be drawing the soul out and placing it in an unnatural position. It was regarded as a process of transforming a man into a ghost before his time.

CERTAIN RELATIONS OF SOUL TO BODY AS EXPRESSED AMONG SOME TRIBES.

Chinook. The soul resembles fire, and at death sparks are said to fall down. When a person is about to die, the soul is thought to be heavy, but when he is recovering it is light.

Ainu (Japan). The destruction of a body, whatever the form of it may be,—tree, brute, beast or man—is likened to the stripping off of one coat to discover another beneath. The spirit still retains its inner form. Superhuman living forms are thus enshrined in some bodily form.

Chinese. Believe that decapitation makes headless souls in Hades.

Australian. Cuts off the right thumb of the corpse of his enemy so that he cannot throw the ghostly spear with the mutilated hand.

Eskimo. Think that the soul has the same shape as the body to which it belongs, but that it is of a more subtle and ethereal nature. It is pale and soft and cannot be felt.

Tongans. The soul is believed to be the finer, more aeriform part of the body, related to it as the perfume and essence of a flower is to the harder parts.

Caribs. Claim that the soul is visible, but subtle and thin like the purified body.

Romans (Mantanist prophetess) Tertulian *De Anima*, 9. The soul is thin and lucid, aerial in color, and of human form.

Wuttke (German writer on Ghosts). Ghosts have bodies and a misty, evanescent materiality.

Calmet (Theologian) Vol. I, Ch. xli. Immaterial souls have their own vaporous bodies, bodies provided by supernatural means to appear as spectres; or they may have power to condense the air into bodies.

FORMS OF COMPOSITION.

Wetarese. The soul is likened to the smell of a flower.

Malayans. Believe that the soul escapes through the nostrils.

Siamese. The soul thought to be subtle matter, escaping touch and sight.

Greeks (Epicurus) Diog. Laert., X, 67-8. The soul could neither do nor suffer were it incorporeal.

Romans (Tertullian). The soul is considered material. (1) It is nourished by the body. (2) It cannot be thought of without materiality. (3) A suffering soul must be material. It has human form of an ethereal and light color. It is a clarified, ethereal body.

Hervey Islanders. When the spirit returns from one of its voyages of visit or adventure, some difficulty and excitement is occasioned,—this causes a tingling and enlivening sensation of the body and sneezing.

Bororó (S. Amer.). To sneeze indicates a message from some dead relative,—a spiritual visit.

Similarity to Cloud.

Hervey Islanders. Warrior spirits are thought to constitute the dark clouds of the morning. In cool, cloudy weather the air is thought to be full of spirits. On bright days the spirits take their departure.

Saxony (Seven Cities). When a virtuous man dies, his soul is believed to escape from his mouth as a little white cloud.

Kant died on a nearly cloudless day; only one little white cloud floated in the azure sky. A soldier taking notice of this, remarked, "See,¹ that is the soul of Kant floating toward Heaven."

THE SOUL AS AN OBJECT.

That the soul possesses form or shape is the most generally accepted idea; that it assumes the form of some object is also a common belief. The idea of the soul's being a material object can be only the crudest savage notion, and then it is probable that the object has a symbolic significance.

Beginning with the conceptions of ghost and shadow as material representatives of the soul among primitive peoples, Spencer² thinks that from the lowest savage to the highest stages of civilization, a serial classification of beliefs can be made, from the purely material to the immaterial. The classification would correspond with progress in lines of culture and civilization.

Few tribes would compare the soul to a lifeless object, or much less identify it as such an object. We cannot well conceive a state of mind so inferior and inactive; one that could form some notion of soul and yet say that the soul and object are one. We must take it for granted that we do not fully understand what they mean. The first consideration is that the savage is unable to conceive of the soul as separated from a body.

"Body and soul,"³ "form in the thought of the savage an inner association so closely wrought that he is unable to consider the soul without a body or the body without a soul." As a result of this close connection between the body and the soul in the primitive mind, among some peoples the bodies of the dead, especially of malefactors, are destroyed, in different ways, to prevent the return of the soul. The same writer cites numerous instances of practices, such as placing coins on the eyes and mouth, and others of like character, continued even to-day, superstitious customs that have grown out of the identification of body and soul.

The following identify soul and object.

Fijians. They regard the shooting-stars as gods, and the smaller ones as the departing souls of men.

Lithuanians. Shooting stars are supposed to be the souls of dying men.

Nishinam (Ind. of Cal.). When these Indians see the dust columns

¹Robinson: *Psychologie der Naturvölker*, p. 14.

²*Sociology*, p. 197.

³*Op. cit.*, p. 43.

so common in California, they think that some soul is ascending in them to the Happy Western Land.

Algonquins. The story was current among the Algonquins that an old chief having lost his son, journeyed to the land of souls and begged so hard for the soul of his son that the Indian Pluto finally gave it to him in the form and size of a nut.

FORM.

Closely related to the last section we have various notions of form and composition of the soul. Tylor¹ says "My own view is that nothing but dreams and visions could have ever put into men's minds such an idea as that of souls being ethereal images of bodies."

What are some of the ideas of form?

The medicine man of the Flathead Indians² is able to restore the lost soul to the sick patient. After a preliminary of cantations in the darkness of the night, he kindles a fire and sorts out the proper soul from the store of those of the dead and living people he has on hand. The soul may have the shape of a bit of bone, splinter of wood, or shell, etc. It is restored to the patient first by placing it on his head,—from thence it is supposed to descend into the body.

Eskimo (Angekoks). Claim that the soul is white and yielding and when one attempts to grasp it, he feels nothing, because it possesses neither flesh, bones or nerves.

Hurons. It was thought that the soul had a head and body, arms and legs; that it was a complete miniature model of man himself.

Nias Islanders (West of Sumatra). The individual chooses the size and the desired length and weight of his soul before he is born. "The heaviest soul ever given out weighs about ten grammes." The length of a man's life is proportioned to the length of his soul.

"The³ sick man's soul is restored to him in the shape of a firefly, visible only to the sorcerer who catches it in a cloth and places it on the head of a patient."

The Dyak priest of Sarawak conjures the lost soul of the sick man into a cup where it is "seen by the uninitiated as a lock of hair, but by the initiated as a miniature human being." It is then supposed to be thrust by the priest into a hole in the top of the patient's head. Sometimes the soul resembles cotton seeds.

"Amongst the Canadian Indians, when a wizard wished to kill a man he sent out his familiar spirits, who brought him the victim's soul in the shape of a stone or the like. The wizard struck the soul with a sword or an ax till it bled profusely, and as it bled the man to whom it belonged died."

Saxons. The soul is considered to have the same form as the body.

¹Prim. Culture, Vol. I, p. 450.

²Wilkes: Narrative U. S. Exploring Expedition, Vol. IV, p. 448.

³Frazer: Vol. I, pp. 122-139.

Tennyson. "In Memoriam."

"Eternal form shall still divide
The eternal soul from all beside;
And I shall know him when we meet."

Java (Chinese). The souls of dead relatives who have prospered and have been honored are believed to pass over into their posterity.

Susu. It is believed that the spirit of a dead person may take up its abode in the grandchild.

IDEAS OF GHOSTS.

Visible and tangible expressions of soul.

The word ghost has its origin in the German. The German word *geist*,—ghost is connected with *gust*, yeast, gas, and even with the hissing of geysers of Iceland. Teutonic gheist comes from the root word meaning to blow with violence. English ghost and gust are derived from the same word.

The Icelandic word *geyser*, and likewise the Scandinavian *gjösa* mean to pour forth.

It is very probable that the idea of ghosts is closely connected with that of the breath. The condensation of moisture borne by the exhaled air may have suggested the color. Some ideas expressed by primitive peoples as to ghosts and spirits are as follows:

Negroes (W. Coast Africa). *Srahman*, "ghost" or "goblin," also means lightning.

Netela. Word "*piuts*" mean breath and soul.

Eskimo. *Silla*—air, or reasoning faculty.

Aztecs. Word "*ehecatl*" had the meaning of wind, of soul, or life.

Yakama (Oregon Ind.). "*Wkrisha*" expresses wind, "*wkrishwit*" means life.

Dakota Ind. "*Niya*" means breath, literally; figuratively, life.

Negroes (East Coast Africa). Flour is offered to spirits who eat the essence of it. Other tribes, *e. g.*, Galelas and Tohelorese of Hulma-hera, Dyaks, and Yorubas, believe that spirits consume the essence of food.

Guiana Ind. Always thinks he sees a spirit in any instrument that does him harm.

Adamanese. Death, sickness, and calamities of any kind are attributed to evil spirits.

New Caledonians. White men are believed to be spirits of the dead and are thought to bring sickness.

Africans (Negroes). When a person dies the air is thought to be unusually full of spirits. Much of the noise of the funeral orgie is to drive them away.

West Africa (Negroes). The soul becomes a ghost, but can be seen only by the wong-man or spirit-doctor.

West Coast of Africa (Negroes). Believe in two kinds of ghosts—those who have met sudden death as in battle or accident, and those dying of old age and from disease. The first linger about their former habitations, clad in white and streaked with clay,—they have not completed their proper term of life. The latter are not seen but pass at once into the land of ghosts.

Central Africa. Some of these tribes have their religious doctrines based on belief in harmful ghosts.

Winnebago (Ind.). Believe in wood spirits. They are described as a rather small animal, with round face and glittering eyes, sometimes seen by man. They are believed to be the cause of disease.

Iroquois. The word "uq-skĕn-nĕ" means a spectre, phantom, the ghost or manes of a dead or living body, death itself. It is applicable only to the sensitive soul, not to the rational.

Turanian Tribes (North Asia). The spirits of the dead Shamans are the ones that plague the living.

Patagonians. Believe that the souls of their wizards become evil demons.

Finns. Ghosts are seen by Shamans only, by others in dreams.

Karens. Believe that a man's spirit disembodied before death may appear to announce his death.

Maons. The sight of an absent person denotes his death.

Peruvians. The soul is thought to rise out of the tomb with all that belongs to the body. It roves about, feeling cold, thirst, hunger and toil.

Hervey Islanders. Believe that the spirits of warriors slain in battle wander for a while among the rocks and trees where the body has been thrown, bearing visible marks of the wounds. They utter sounds like those of crickets.

Karens. The "la" or ghost sometimes appears after death and cannot then be distinguished from the person himself.

Araucanians. Think that the soul, when separated from the body, exercises the same functions in another life as in this, unaccompanied by fatigue and satiety.

Natives of the Antilles. Ghosts are said to appear in the roads, but not to every person.

Australians. Ghosts of the unburied dead are thought to become malignant spirits.

(Aborigines). Believe in an evil spirit called "Metagong" which prowls about at night and catches hold of them if they leave the camp-fire. It is visible occasionally, being of human form and immense size, and of so great strength as to make it useless to offer resistance.

Australians. "The¹ precautions taken by murderers (among the primitive Greeks) to lay the ghost of the slain man were much like those in favor among the *Australians*. The Greek cut off the extremities of his victim, the tips of the hands and feet, and disposed them neatly beneath the arm-pits of the slain man. In the same spirit, and for the same purpose, the Australian black cuts off the thumbs of his dead enemy, that the ghost, too, may be mutilated and prevented from throwing at him with a ghostly spear.

West Africans (Krumen). Europeans are called the ghost tribe. Natives of old Calabar call them spirit-men; Mpongwe call them "ghosts."

Prince of Wales Islands (Darnley Islands Natives). The word used to signify white man, also means ghost.

Chinese. Believe that decapitation makes headless souls in Hades. The souls of beggars and lepers sorely annoy the living.

Israelites. Samuel's ghost was seen by the witch of Endor, but not by Saul.

Greeks. Ghosts are believed to have substantiality, and to drink blood. They recover memory and reason, and recognize their friends,

¹ A. Lang: *Mythology, Ritual and Religion*, Vol. I, p. 259.

but not until they have nourished themselves from the blood of some victim.

(Achilles to Patroclus.) "Alas, there is indeed then, even in the dwellings of Hades, a certain spirit and image, but there is no body in it at all."

St. Anthony saw the soul of St. Ammonius carried to Heaven in the midst of a choir of angels.

Newly baptized children saw the holy bishop, St. Ambrose, in spirit when he died.

VOICES OF SPIRITS, SOULS OR GHOSTS.

One of the attributes of the soul, according to primitive belief, is that of voice. The sounds that the spirit or soul is supposed to utter are sometimes heard in the lamentations or hisses of birds, in the moaning of the winds, or in other peculiar noises which may cause even civilized man when alone at night, to experience a shudder.

Chaimas (S. A. Ind.). The cries of the goat-sucker heard in caverns are attributed to the spirits of their ancestors, and nothing can induce these Indians to enter these dark caves.

Makusi (British Guiana). The cries of the goat-sucker at night are believed to be voices of departed souls which are regarded by them as evil spirits.

Abipones (Ind.). These Indians regard the ducks that fly about at night, uttering hissing sounds, to be the souls of departed persons. They believe to hear their shadows speak in the echo.

Tupinambas (Ind.). The prophetic bird is called "Macanhan." It is regarded as the messenger of deceased friends and relatives. The magicians prophesy from the song of this bird.

Algonquin (Ind.). These Indians think they hear the shadow-souls chirp like crickets.

Fuegians. The soul of the deceased person is believed to wander in the woods; an unfamiliar bird's cry is regarded as the cry of a spirit.

New Zealanders. Divine spirits are thought to converse with living persons (spirits) in whistling tones.

Zulus. Ancestral manes are believed to talk in a low whistling tone, this tone is short of a full whistle.

Arabs. Whistling is considered to be talking with devils.

Eskimo. Ghosts and spirits are thought to manifest their presence by a whistling or singing in the ears.

THE NUMBER OF SOULS.

As to the number of souls there is much difference of opinion among different peoples. The idea of a plurality of souls, however, is very common.

Robinson¹ thinks that the idea of more than one soul arose from the fact that sometime after the savage had discovered that there was a life-principle,—something lacking at death—he came, gradually, to comprehend the Ego or I. If this be a true interpretation it affords the basis for a belief in two souls.

¹Psychologie der Naturvölker, p. 33.

There are some tribes, however, who believe in a number of souls—but on the basis, rather, that certain organic functions are regarded as separate souls. Some of the beliefs are as follows:

Malagasy. Believe in three souls: *saina*, or mind; *aina*, or life; and *matoatoo*, or ghost.

Algonquin. Claim that there are two souls, one of which keeps the body animate, remains with it during sleep and after death (until called to enter another body); the other, a physical soul, moves about at will, goes out of the body during dreams or in a trance, and at death goes to the land of spirits.

Dakotas. Most of this tribe believe in four souls. One wanders about the earth and requires food; a second, watches over the body; another hovers around its native village: the fourth goes to the land of spirits.

Iroquois. Believe¹ in two souls, a rational and a bodily soul. Man is thought to have a sensitive soul, which is the animating principle of his body, and one or more reasonable souls, or psychic entities. Of the latter kind, some persons at times are reported to have four or five, at other times, only one or none at all. The animating, or bodily soul, remains in the skeleton at death. The reasonable is represented as subtle and refined, yet material (since it can be enclosed in a gourd); dark and sombre like a shadow, possessing the form of the body, having head, teeth, body, arms, legs, etc., partly blind by day but sharp-sighted at night. It is carnivorous, but eats the food of the living, and can utter sounds and speech.

Hurons. Think that man has two rational souls, both divisible and material. One leaves the body at death and lingers in the cemetery until the feast of the dead; the other is attached to the body.

Sioux. Believe in three souls, one of which goes to a cold place, another to a warm, comfortable country, while the third watches the body.

Chinook (Ind.). Each person is thought to have two souls, a larger and a smaller one. During sickness the smaller one leaves the body.

Choctaw. Every man is believed to have an outside shadow, *shilomlish*, and an inside shadow, *shilup*, both of which survive the body.

Madagascar (Islanders). Believe that there are three elements of the soul. The feelings, "*saina*," perish at death; the life, "*aina*" passes into the air; and the spirit, "*matoatoa*," hovers about the grave.

Eskimo. Believe in two souls, the breath and the shadow.

Olo-Nagadjoe (Dyak of Borneo). Two souls. These are united in the body under the name, "*hambaruan*." At death, one of these, the "*Lian*," is separated from the body,—this is the conscious individuality. The other, "*Karahang*," is more material and remains with the body.

Nias. Ascribed to man three souls, these were identified with the breath, heart and shadow. The first, "*noso*," comes from the air and returns to it at death, but passes on to posterity. The shadow, "*beahn zi-mate*," is seen by day, but by the priests at any time. It becomes a spirit at death. The third, "*noso-dado*," soul of the heart, is the most complete, being the seat of thought, feeling, joy and anger. It exists after death in the form of a spider.

Fijians. Believe in a dark spirit, or shadow, and a light spirit or reflection.

¹ *Journal Amer. Folklore*, 1895, p. 109.

Natives of Tonga. "All men¹ have not souls capable of a separate existence, only the Egi, or nobles, possess a spiritual part, which goes to Bolotoo, the land of gods and ghosts, after death, and enjoys power similar to that of the original gods, but less."

Greenlanders. Some of these believe in two souls, shadow and breath.

Khonds. Have a fourfold division of the soul. The first soul is restored to or absorbed by the good Deity, Boora; the second is attached to the Khond tribe and is reborn in succeeding generations; the third, goes out in dreams and holds spiritual intercourse; and the fourth dies with the dissolution of the body.

Chinese. Believe in three souls and six spirits. The latter being animal go into the ground at death. Of the three souls, one goes down into Hades, the second enters the coffin and is laid in the grave (but not to remain), the third lingers around its old home, and with the second receives the worship of posterity.

Egyptians. Regard the soul of an individual as being a complex of a number of elements, or spirits. These are immortal. One, the "ka," is similar to the man as he appears in thought or dream; another of these immortal parts, "ab," corresponds to the heart; a third, the "ba," is a material conception of the soul, usually a bird, with human head and hands; a fourth part, the "shân," is the form of a mummy; a fifth, the "xaib," is the shadow; while a sixth "xu," exists as an appearance or reflection of the mummy. (1) ba—warmth of life, breath; (2) ab—heart; (3) xaib—shadow; (4) ka, sâhu, xu, and Osiris—soul comprehended as copy of the body.

Hindus. Distinguish between Brahmatmah, the breath of God, and Jivatmah, the breath of life.

Hindu philosophy. Emanative Souls and Genetic Souls.

Persians (Zoroaster). Soul consists of five parts. (1) The feroher or principle of sensation; (2) boo or principle of intelligence; (3) the rouh, or rouan, the principle of practical judgment, imagination, volition; (4) the akho, or principle of conscience; (5) and the jan or principle of life. The first three united, are the principles which are accountable for the deeds of man. The jan mingles with the winds, the akho returns to heaven and has a separate existence.

Jews (Rabbis). Taught a three-fold division: (1) Nephesh, the animal; (2) ruah, the human principle of life; and (3) Neshamah, the divine soul.

Greeks (Plato). Make three divisions of the soul:

λογιστικον, επιδυμητικον, θυμος or θυμοειδες,

(Aristotle.) Divided the soul into three parts: (1) the mere nourishing soul (anima vegetativa), or plant soul; (2) the sensing soul (anima sensitiva), or animal soul; (3) the reasonable thinking soul (anima rationalis). All three of these parts are supposed to be united during life. The first two die with the body; the third is immortal.

Greeks (Philosophy of Alexander). Taught that the soul consists of two parts. The (πνευμα) Pneuma, corresponds to the Biblical "Neshamah," which God breathed into man. The (ψυχη) Psuche corresponds to the "Nephesh" whose seat is in the blood.

Romans. Believed in a three-fold division of the soul: the manes, the anima, and the umbra. To each of these a different place was assigned.

Romans (Ovid). The shades flit around the tomb; the underworld receives the image; the spirit seeks the stars.

¹ Lang: Mythology, Ritual and Religion, Vol. II, p. 25.

(Pliny.) The soul remains on earth, the shade or umbra is removed to Elysium or Tartarus, depending upon deeds.

New Testament Idea (of Jews). Paul, in "The Epistle to the Romans," chapters 8 and 13, mentions bodily soul, intellectual soul, and spiritual gifts. These convey the idea of plurality.

Mediæval Theories. Ascribed three souls to man, the vegetal, the sensitive, and the rational.

LOCALIZATION.

Where did primitive man locate the soul? There were great differences of opinion on this question. Some regarded one organ as central, some another.

The heart and pulse are often pointed out. These parts, as seat of the soul, emphasize the close connection in the belief of primitive man, between what was regarded as the soul and life itself.

Ideas in regard to the HEART are as follows:

Egyptians. The ancient Egyptians thought that the heart was the seat of the soul.

Ancient Hindus. According to the teachings of the Veda, the soul was believed to be located in the heart.

Samoyeds. The heart is believed to be the seat of the soul.

Caribs (Indians). It is thought that there are as many souls as there are pulses that can be felt. The heart soul goes to the gods; the inferior ones roam as evil spirits.

Sacs and Foxes (Indians). The heart is believed to be the seat of wisdom and of the soul.

Winnebagoes (Indians). It is believed that the Great Spirit cut a piece from his body and made man and woman.

Nicaraguan (Ind.). The heart is considered immortal, the immortal part of it making life.

Tonanese. The soul is claimed to be co-extensive with the body, but chiefly in the heart.

Aztec. The heart is considered the seat of the soul; and being the most precious part of the body it is the offering to the gods.

Chancas. The word "soncon" is used for soul, this word also means heart.

Basutos (Negroes). It is said of the dead, his heart has gone forth.

Ashantis (Negroes). The heart is thought to be the heart of the soul.

Blood.

The blood has been thought by some to contain the soul. This was believed to be the seat of the soul because as it poured forth from the person, or perhaps an animal, life ebbed with it. Homer uses this expression:¹ "The blood flows from the (Psyche)

wound and the life ($\psi\upsilon\chi\eta$) flows from the wound." On the basis of the belief in the life principle of the blood, we have the custom, more common in the past than now, but still prevalent, of mixing of blood as symbolic of bonds of friendship.

Esthonians. Some² of these people will not touch blood because

¹ Robinsohn: *Psychologie der Naturvölker*, p. 18.

² Frazer: *Golden Bough*, Vol. I, p. 178.

they believe it contains the animal's soul. This soul would then enter their body.

N. A. Indians. Some of the Indians of North America believe that the blood contains the life and spirit of the beast and they abstain from its use. To rid the game of any evil that might befall them they pass it through smoke and flame several times to destroy the blood, life, or animal spirits.

Papuan (N. Guinea). These have held similar views about the blood.

Eastern Islanders. Animals¹ for food are stunned or suffocated. This method, it is thought, is to prevent the shedding of blood on the ground. The soul residing in the blood, any ground on which it falls becomes sacred.

Jews. As noted in Leviticus,² related also by Josephus,³ the Jews would not taste the blood of animals they had killed. They either believed that the soul or life of the animal was in the blood or that the blood actually was the soul.

Arabs. These held beliefs concerning the blood similar to those of the Esthonians, N. A. Indians, Papuans, and others.

Romans. Views similar to the foregoing were held. Virgil in his *Æneid*⁴ speaks of the purple blood as the purple soul.

Greeks. The Greek writers,⁵ Empedocles, Critias and Galen identify the soul with the blood.

Bones.

Iroquois. A part of the soul was thought to be located in the bones. *esken*—bone, *atiskén*—soul.

Athapaskan. The bones were believed to be the seat of the soul. *yani*—bone, *iyune*—soul.

Caribs. The bones of the dead were gathered once a year.

Indians East of Miss. Most of the tribes cared for the bones of the dead.

Breath.

The root *an* furnishes many words for wind, breath, soul and spirit.

Sanskrit { *Anila*—wind; *prana*—spirit; *atman*—self. The word *at-*
man originally meant breath, then life, sometimes body;
but far more frequently, the essence or the *self*.
(*anemos*)

Greek. (*veuos*)—wind.

Latin. *Anima*—air, wind, breath, life, soul, spirit. *Animus*—soul, spirit.

Irish. *Anal*—breath, *anam*—life or soul.

The breath is assumed to be the seat of life among some peoples; in most instances its relation to the idea of the soul is conveyed by different meanings attached to the word. "The analogy between soul and breath was so plain," says Baring-Gould,⁶ "that it was at once concluded that they were identi-

¹ Frazer: *Golden Bough*, Vol. I, p. 183.

² Chap. xvii, 10-14.

³ *Antiquities of the Jews*. Book III, Sec. 2.

⁴ Book IV, p. 349.

⁵ Aristotle: *De. An.* I, 2, 19.

⁶ *Origin and Development of Relig. Beliefs*, p. 93.

cal, or if not identical, were very similar." Various ideas are expressed as follows :

West Australians. The word "wang" is used for breath, spirit and soul.

Malayans. The soul is said to escape from the nostrils.

Java. The word *Nava* is used for breath, life and soul.

Papuans. The words for steam and fog are those used for spirit, rur itam—hot steam—hot spirit—rur aiknand—fog—tree spirits.

Seminole. A newborn child, whose mother has died, is held above her face in order that it may inhale the escaping spirit.

Mohawks. From the root word "atourion," to breathe, is derived the word "atouritz," the soul.

Slavonian. Duh—breath, spirit; dusa—soul; dounon—to breathe; dyma—seat of force, mind.

Hungarian. Szél—wind; szellő—wind, breath; szellem—soul, spirit.

Sigourney Islanders. Tucho—breeze, breath, air, spirit; dulo tucho—Holy Ghost.

Egyptians. The words ba—soul, bas—bodily warmth, and nafi—breath, were used. In their creation myths, breath means soul.

Hebrews. The word "ruah" sometimes means wind, sometimes life or soul.

Greeks. The word (*ψυχη*) psuche, is breath or soul from a root expressive of blowing. Psugmos (*ψυγμος*)—drying effect of a blast of wind, or an effect of cold. From the same radical (*πνέω*) pneio, to blow,—(*πνευμα*) pneuma.

Costa Rica Ind. The liver was regarded as the seat of thought and memory.

New England Ind. Soul was believed to be located in the brain.

Natives of Leti, Moa, and Lake Islands. The organs of procreation are thought to be the seat of the soul.

Naudowessies. It is believed that the father gives the child its soul, the mother, its body.

The Karens. Suppose that a being called Tso resides in the upper part of the head, and while it maintains its place no harm can befall the person from the efforts of the personified passions. But if the Tso becomes weak, evil is sure to result to the person. For this reason the hair is carefully dressed and attired, and the head well cared for so as to be pleasing to the Tso.

Siamese. A similar idea is that of the Siamese,¹ who think that a spirit called the Khuan dwells in the head. This is the guardian spirit and must be well cared for, so that the acts of shaving and cutting the hair become ceremonies.

ANIMALS.

Some tribes ascribe souls to animals alone; others, to both animals and plants, extending the idea even further sometimes, so as to include all objects that cast a shadow. Spencer² thinks the belief that everything has a soul has been arrived at by a process of reasoning. Beginning with man himself, the savage sees that he breathes and casts a shadow; this he identifies with his other self, or ghost. Then he notes that animals likewise breathe and cast shadows. So he concludes that they,

¹ Frazer : *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 188.

² Sociology, Vol. I, p. 193.

too, must have another self, or ghost. Thus, the writer thinks, they have passed on from animals to plants and other objects, and, as in the case of the Fijians, to every object. Different writers, students of the condition of primitive man, have noted that he places the animals on an equality with himself, and even regards them in some respects his superior. He will talk to them and, as Tylor³ relates, in the case of such tribes as the Kafirs, Ainos, Samoyeds, Dyaks, and some Indians, when the game has been killed, he will offer some apology or condonation to the departed spirit of the animal. At night, as Brinton⁴ notes, the ways of the animals were guided by a wit beyond the divination of the savage and they were able to gain a living with little toil or trouble. "They did not mind the darkness, so terrible to him, but through the night called one to the other in a tongue whose meaning he could not fathom, but which, he doubted not, was as full of purport as his own." They had sly and strange faculties which he recognized, and he doubted not that at one time he had possessed the instinct of his brute companions. From his close relationship, living and contending with them, we are not surprised that the savage should attribute to animals a spirit akin to his own.

Apaches. The owl, the eagle, and all perfectly white birds were regarded as possessing souls of divine origin.

Maricopas. Believe that after death they will return to their ancient home on the banks of the Colorado River. Then their heads will be turned into owls and other parts of their bodies into different animals.

Aht (Ind.). The soul is thought to issue from gulls and partridges, and after death they will return to their original forms.

Chippeways. Believe that animals have souls, also that inorganic substances, such as kettles, have in them a similar essence.

Fijians. Not only mankind, but animals, plants, and all manufactured articles are believed to possess souls.

Mexicans. Think that because every object has a shadow it has a god.

Algonquin. The hunter is thought to continue his chase in the happy hunting ground, in pursuit of the souls of his game.

The Indians of North America believed that animals had spirits and usually buried some animal with a dead warrior.

Sioux. The bear is regarded as having four souls.

Greenlander. Think that a sick human soul may be replaced with the soul of a hare, reindeer, or of a child.

Hovas of Madagascar. Ghosts of animals are sometimes seen to appear.

Maori. Spirits of dogs are believed to descend to the Hades of the departed.

Kamschadales. It is thought that every creature, even the smallest fly, will live again in the underworld.

Kukes of Assam. The ghost of every animal that the hunter kills will belong to him in the next life.

³ Prim. Cult., Vol. I, p. 422.

⁴ The Myths of the New World, p. 122.

Karens. The spirit of the animal is thought liable to wander and suffer injury.

Zulus. Believe that cattle will come to life again and be the property of the dwellers in the world beneath.

Siamese. The butcher beseeches the spirit of the slaughtered ox to seek a happier abode.

Greeks (Pythagoras, Plato). Believed that animals have undying souls.

Romans (Juvenal Sat. XV, 148). Lower animals are said to have the anima but not the human soul, animus.

French (Descartes). Animals are mere machines.

English (Wesley). In the next life, animals will be raised above their state in this life. Horridness will be exchanged for primeval beauty.

English (Adam Clarke). Animals do not sin, are not involved in the sins of man; cannot have adequate happiness in this life, but have it in the hereafter.

SOULS ASCRIBED TO PLANTS.

We find a few definite instances of this belief. No doubt if the subject were investigated more closely, at first hand, it would be found that the soul as the life principle is advocated by most savages. "Plants, partaking with animals," says Tylor,¹ "the phenomena of life and death, health and sickness, not unnaturally have some kind of soul ascribed to them." The idea of a vegetable soul was common in mediæval philosophy, and Tylor thinks that "the doctrine of the spirits of plants lay deep in the intellectual history of South East Asia," but has been superseded by Buddhist influence.

Society Islanders. Varma, the surviving soul of man, is ascribed to plants also.

Dyaks (Borneo). Ascribe to rice a spirit, the departure of which causes decay of the crop.

Karens. Believe that plants have their souls called "la." The spirit of sickly rice may be called back.

Buddhists. The early belief of the Buddhists was divided. It was a disputed question whether, if plants had souls, they might be lawfully injured or not.

The subject, however, assumes two aspects, closely related to the belief that the plant has a soul similar to that of man. One is, that trees and plants, as held by some tribes, are the abodes of spirits. This superstition naturally leads to tree-worship. The other is, that the tree, as in the theory of transmigration, becomes for a time the resting-place of the human soul.

CONCLUSION.

In this chapter, on primitive ideas of the soul, the following data are presented; (1) Theories as to how an idea of the soul may have arisen; (2) The probable influences of the dream, shadow, breath, etc., in shaping the concept of soul; (3) Data on various aspects of the soul-idea.

¹ Prim. Cult., Vol. I, p. 428.

No very general conclusions can be drawn. The soul is most frequently described: first, as shadow; second, as breath; third, as wind; then as life, heart, echo, etc. The dream as the strongest influence in giving birth to an idea of the soul is revealed. This is probably not true for the child, as it is generally believed to be the result of teaching.

Different animal species exhibit certain capabilities, as flight by the birds, swiftness of foot by the deer, etc.; these are impossible feats for the savage, they are acts furnishing food for his imagination, they inspire him, and from the union of such traits he forms his ideal. That is, the inspiration of the savage is got from the special adaptations of different animal species. The primitive idea of soul cannot be classed as psychological, or philosophical. It is connected more or less with superstitious beliefs, and as such may be classified with their religion. By soul the savage probably means life, it is related to no personal God, nor is any thought of mind conveyed in the idea. It is most frequently a shadow-like form of the individual that will enjoy certain favors after death.

GREEK IDEAS REGARDING THE SOUL.

It may not have been an entirely new procedure for man, to consider, in some crude way, his possessions, to measure up his stock in trade,—so to speak—to compare it with animals or other persons, to consider his power or ability and observe in some way how he is fitted to cope with his environment. It may not have been an entirely new departure for man to try to shape his destiny, to seek to discover the wherefore of his existence, to desire knowledge as to what he actually is in comparison with other things, or what he is expected to do. Is he serving a master? if so, to find out the character of this master, his will, etc., and further to learn something of the material with which he has to deal. The savage world is a great animated one, the dispositions of its numerous inhabitants being very similar to savage life. To the savage the great invisible world is sufficient to account for everything which is not directly observable by the senses. This has sufficed for a long time. It satisfied the dwellers of Greece for a long period. The spirit world is in matter, and is sufficient to account for the cause of things. That these spirits exist, the savage has strong proofs. When he sleeps his soul visits other souls of this spirit world, and when he dies the soul is free to dwell there. Everything has a soul like him; and then, too, there are many things that happen that nothing but spirits can do. This explanation did not always satisfy the Greek mind. Dwelling as they did in a country where intercourse among themselves, as inhabitants of colonies, was easy; partially shut

out from the barbaric world, no longer nomadic, they made great advancement, not only materially, in accumulation of wealth and development of the country, but intellectually, as well. The conditions were favorable for furthering the training of the mind, and were such as perhaps never existed before. With the development of the mind, there began a search for this spirit that ruled; the immortal being that ordered all things. With this search we have the beginnings of the cosmological period of their philosophy. The true relation of man to nature, or the abiding, must relate to that part of him that abides. Three periods of Greek philosophy are generally recognized. During the period of hylozoistic monism¹ the ancient Ionians regarded matter as something living; in itself it was animated just as are particular organisms. This was the first step. It was superseded by dualism in the systems of Empedocles and Anaxagoras. Then the distinction between the spiritual and the corporeal was brought out, also that between matter and force was shown by Empedocles and Democritus. The distinction of true knowledge and phenomenon is a recognition of the mental in the Eleatic school. This is taken up by the Pythagoreans. With Anaxagoras the spiritual is the principle of all being, the material without the impulse of the spirit is nothing. The advent of the idea, the concept-philosophy of Socrates, represents in Plato the dualism of mind and matter, soul and body.

Two courses of influence must be recognized in considering early Greek ideas of the soul. The early cosmologists did not take account of the individual soul in their systems, that was explained satisfactorily by their religious beliefs. The mystery with which they grappled was that of a basal material (Ionians) or fundamental form (Pythagoreans) of the world. It was only after a relation had been established between this world principle and the soul of popular belief that it came to be scientifically considered. Then it was considered in connection with the entire course of the universe.

The fundamental principle Thales declares to be water. He thinks the whole world is full of souls. The loadstone is said to have a soul because it moves iron. What he regarded as soul was something endowed with the power of motion. Why should this first principle have been water or moisture? Aristotle² thinks that it was perhaps because the germs of all beings are of a moist nature, or because the nourishment is moist. This is interesting as being one of the first recorded attempts to solve the mystery of life. Living near a body of water was

¹Siebeck: *Geschichte der Psychologie*, pp. 27-29.

²Met., I, 3. 983, b. 6. (Fairbanks.)

perhaps an influential factor, for Thales thought the earth rested on water and floated like a piece of wood. The solution dealt with motion and mutability. Anaximander considered the infinite or unlimited (something) to be the primitive matter of all things, while Anaximenes thought it to be air. All things spring from air by rarefaction or condensation, *i. e.*, by heating and cooling. "Air is the nearest to an immaterial thing; for since we are generated in the flow of air it is necessary that it should be infinite and abundant, because it is never exhausted." Air is the first principle of things; from this all things arise and into this they are all resolved again. "As¹ our soul which is air holds us together, so wind (*i. e.*, breath, *pneuma*) and air encompass the world." This is closely related to the ideas of many primitive peoples who associate soul with breath as the life-giving principle.

These represent the fundamental principles of the Ionic school, two substances are mentioned, the aim being rather to present the thing most essential for life, for animated matter; they were not yet interested in soul. As for Hippo and Diogenes of Apollonia, pupils in the same school, the former regarded moisture as the first principle, while the latter regarded the air as the substance of which all things consist. This substance must be eternal, unchangeable, great and powerful, and rich in knowledge. The air possesses these qualities; it is the essence in which reason dwells.

Some passages from the fragments left by Herakleitos convey some idea of what he meant by his continual flux, and the nature of primitive matter. "All² things are exchanged for fire, and fire for all things, as wares are exchanged for gold and gold for wares." "Fire lives in the death of earth, and air lives in the death of fire, water lives in the death of air, and earth in that of water." "Gods are mortals, men are immortals, each living in the other's death and dying in the other's life." "For to souls it is death to become water, and for water it is death to become earth; but water is formed from earth, and from water, soul." "The limits of the soul you could not discover, though traversing every path." "It is a delight to souls to become wet."

"When a man gets drunk, he is led about by a beardless boy, stumbling, not knowing whither he goes, for his soul is wet." "The dry soul is wisest and best." "It is hard to contend with passion; for whatever it desires to get it buys at the cost of soul." "All things are full of souls and of divine spirits." "Man like a light in the night is kindled and put

¹ Aet., I, 3. Dox., 278. (Diels.)

² Fairbanks: The First Philosophers of Greece, pp. 25-59.

out." Religious rites are cures for the soul. We learn from Plato and Aristotle that Herakleitos thought all things to be motion; to him nothing abides, all things in the course of time become fire. The first principle is soul, all other things consisting of a fiery exhalation from it. There is a flow of all things upward and downward; the stages are earth, water, air, fire. The qualities of soul are manifested in the exhalations of fire. Unlike the early Ionic cosmologists, we note a trace of religious teaching in his system. Two lines of thought are mingled and in some passages the soul is spoken of in a popular way signifying the person or individual. Then again a trace of the scientific is brought in; but regarding his teachings as a whole, Herakleitos is considered more of a metaphysician than physicist. The teachings of Xenophenes were contrary to the mythology of his time. According to his belief, all things come from the earth and return to it. One God rules; he is supreme. The primitive essence is the divine spirit ruling the universe. For Parmenides the truly existent has the attributes of an abstract conception of being. "Therefore thinking and that by reason of which thought exists are one and the same thing, for thou wilt not find, thinking without the *being* from which it receive its name, nor is there nor will there be anything apart from being; for fate has linked it together, so that it is a whole and immovable."

"For that which thinks is the same, namely the substance of the limbs, in each and every man, for their thought is that of which there is most in them."

With Empedocles we have a duality in the sense of opposites and their effects. Love tends to make one out of many, strife tends to make many out of one. Love and strife control things. There are four original elements, fire, air, water and earth. From Aristotle we learn of Empedocles, that, "as many¹ as pay careful attention to the fact that what was soul is in motion, these assume that soul is the most important source of motion; and as many as consider that it knows and perceives beings, these say that the first principle is soul, some making more than one first principle and others making one, as Empedocles says the first principle is the product of all the elements, and each of these is soul."

"And² in like manner it is strange that soul should be the cause of the mixture; for the mixture of the elements does not have the same cause as flesh and bone. The result, then, will be that there are many souls through the whole body, if all things arise out of the elements that have been mingled to-

¹ De Anima I, 2; 404 b 7.

² De Anima I, 4; 408 a 14.

gether; and the cause of the mixture is harmony and soul." "The soul is a mixture¹ of what is air and ether in essence." Mind and soul are the same. The soul is imperishable. The knowledge we have of Empedocles's ideas of the soul is derived chiefly from other writers. We find that he regarded the blood as the real carrier of life; since it was thought to be the most perfect combination of the four elements. The perceptive knowledge depends upon the combination of elements, and the spiritual nature as he understood it depends upon the physical nature; that is, it is the result of certain combinations.

As to the teachings of Pythagoras and his school, we can only follow what later members say. Little is known of the early doctrine; but it is believed, however, to have been dualistic. It is supposed that they postulated world soul and that the origin of the soul of man was ascribed to this. Some of the Pythagoreans held that solar corpuscles are souls. The soul was considered to be a harmony or a number. From the doxographers we learn that "Pythagoras² held that one of the first principles, the monad, is god and the good, which is the origin of the One, and is itself intelligence." "Divine spirits are psychical beings; and heroes are souls separated from bodies, good heroes are good souls, bad heroes, bad souls." "For Pythagoras, who held that the soul is extended through all the nature of things and mingled with them, and that from this our souls are taken, did not see that God would be separated and torn apart by the separation of human souls; and when souls are wretched, as might happen to many, then part of God would be wretched; a thing which could not happen." The harmony of opposites and the essence of number symbolize the soul. The soul is an immortal being passing through stages of perfection in animal life. The body is the prison or tomb of the soul.

Anaxagoras taught that all things have existed from the beginning in infinitesimally small fragments, fragments of gold, fragments of flesh, etc. The task of collecting and arranging these particles was performed by mind, or reason (*nous*). With Anaxagoras we have an intelligent principle as the cause of motion. This was a great advance in some respects over the mechanical theories of some of the cosmologists. Soul and mind are the same; it is the moving force of matter. He thought that if a being moves itself it must be mind that produces the motion, the motive power coming not from without but from within. For him this motive principle becomes a soul. But since the *nous* exists apart from man, the mental

¹ Fairbanks: *The First Philosophers of Greece*, p. 226.

² Fairbanks: *op. loc.*, pp. 133-153.

process depends on a being outside the world, and there is no natural process of knowledge.

"Other things¹ include a portion of everything, but mind is infinite and self-powerful and mixed with nothing, but it exists alone by itself." For it is the most rarefied of all things and the purest, and it has all knowledge in regard to everything and the greatest power; over all that has life, both greater and less, mind rules. And mind ruled the rotation of the whole, so that it set it in rotation in the beginning."

From Aristotle² we learn that many times Anaxagoras "rightly and truly says that mind is the cause, while at other times he says it is soul; for it is in all animals." "Anaxagoras seems to say that soul and mind are different, but he treats both as one in nature except that he regards mind especially as the first principle of all things." In this system the interesting point is the dualism of mind and matter, and the attempt to define mind in relation to matter. Mind being the finest and most mobile of all matter, is first in importance, while matter becomes secondary. Man partakes of a part of this *nous*, and thus is motivated.

The Atomists, especially Leucippus and Democritus, teach that everything is reducible to the full and the void. Being fills space, non-being, void. Being consists of matter, but matter is composed of minute indivisible atoms. These are underived, imperishable and homogeneous, differing only in size and form. There is an infinite number of forms of atoms, mechanical necessity being the unifying principle of the system. The most important element is fire. It consists of the finest atoms, these being smooth and round, and the smallest of all. It is the principle of motion³ in organisms. These fiery particles are diffused throughout the whole body. There is a soul atom between every pair of body atoms, but the various faculties of the soul have their seat in different parts of the body; thought in the brain, anger in the heart, desire in the liver. On account of the fineness of the soul's atoms, there is danger lest they be forced out of the body by the air that surrounds us; this loss is overcome by inspiration. The body is only the vessel of the soul, and on the latter we should bestow more care than on the former. The excellence of the animal consists in bodily perfection; of man, in moral perfection. The soul is something corporeal like all other things, but more than that, it is the most perfect body. The soul distributed throughout the whole universe is the Deity. Sensation and consciousness are a consequence of the mobility of soul atoms. Thought

¹ Burnett : Early Greek Phil., p. 293.

² De Anim. I; 2,404 b.

³ Zeller : Pre-Socratic Philos., Vol. II, pp. 256-270.

and perception have the same origin; both are material changes of the soul's body, and are occasioned by external impressions—the impact of atoms entering the sense organs.

The elements of early science, combined in the system of Democritus resulted in materialism. The same elements, from the point of view of the Socratic concept, formed the idealistic system of Plato. Socrates, the immediate precursor of Plato, considers the soul to be immortal. His teachings are based entirely on morals; man for him means a seat of moral ideas. For Plato God made the soul out of the following elements: “out¹ of the indivisible and unchangeable, and also out of that which is divisible and has to do with material bodies, he compounded a third and intermediate kind of essence, partaking of the nature of the same and of the other, and this compound he placed, accordingly, in a mean between the indivisible and the divisible and material. He took the three elements of the same, the other, and the essence and mingled them into one form, compressing by force the reluctant and unsociable nature of the other into the same.” This is the soul of the universe, and of this, in a diluted form, the stars partake. The offspring of the divine imitating him, “received² from him the immortal principle of the soul; and around this they proceeded to fashion a mortal body, and made it to be the vehicle of the soul, and constructed within the body a soul of another nature which was mortal, subject to terrible and irresistible affections . . . they gave to the mental nature a separate habitation in another part of the body.” “And in the breast and in what is termed the thorax they encased the mortal soul.” “That part of the inferior soul which is endowed with courage and passion and loves contention they settled nearer the head, midway between the midriff and the neck in order that it might be under the rule of reason. . . . That part of the soul which desires meats and drinks and the other things of which it has need by reason of the bodily nature, they placed between the midriff and the boundary of the navel, contriving in all this region a sort of manger for the food of the body.” God gave the “sovereign part of the human soul to be the divinity of each one,” this part dwells at the top of the body. The soul existed before it entered the body and had intelligence,—memory still retains certain forms of knowledge—“absolute beauty, and goodness, and essence in general.” If these³ absolute ideas existed before we were born then our soul must have existed before we were born.

¹ Timaeus: Jowett, Vol. III, p. 453.

² *Ibid.*, p. 491.

³ Phædo.

The soul is immortal,¹ for that is immortal which is ever in motion; that is, self-moving. Ten thousand years must elapse before the soul can return to the place from which it came; it may then pass into the life of a beast or into a man again. For the lover of knowledge the soul is glued to the body, viewing existence through the bars of a prison. The soul is lasting, the body, weak and short-lived, and every soul may be said to wear out several bodies.

The soul, belonging to the supersensible world, has the qualities of non-origination, indestructibility, unity and changelessness. Since it is the carrier of the idea of life, the cause of its own motion, it is not identical with the ideas. The part relating to the ideas is the directing, reasoning part. The part located in the breast, or courage, belongs to animals; while that found in the lower regions,—that is, desire, or appetite, belongs to plants and animals. These three parts represent three essences combined with each other, and not one essence operating in a three-fold manner,—the soul being their unity. “Each degree² has its own theoretic and practical functions in such a way that the lower functions may exist without the higher, but the higher appear in connection with the lower.”

One advance which Aristotle made over Platonism was based on his insight into the insufficiency of the theory of ideas to explain empirical facts. The super-sensible world of ideas and the world of sense are identical; the universal does not have a higher actuality, separated from sense objects. Nature is the organic bond of all individuals, which actualize their form in motion, pure form being their highest purpose. Windelband³ recognizes two parts to Aristotle's psychology, revealing two scientific points of view. (1) The general theory of animal souls, psychical processes possessed in common by animals and men, though more perfectly developed in man; (2) the doctrine of the *nous* as the distinctive possession of man, this view representing the empirical and the speculative sides of his psychology. The soul being that which holds the body together, is indivisible, and has no parts. “It is⁴ the first entelechy of a natural organized body, having life in potentiality. A double meaning is implied in this definition; either it is the actualization of matter or it is the agent of actualization.

“The soul is not any variety of body, but it cannot be without a body; it is not a body, but it is something belonging to or related to a body; and for this reason it is in a body, and in

¹ Phædrus: Jowett, Vol. I, p. 579.

² Windelband: Hist. of Ancient Phil., p. 207.

³ History of Ancient Phil., p. 276.

⁴ Grote: Aristotle, p. 458.

a body of such or such potentialities." We do not say that the soul weaves or builds; we say that the animated subject, the aggregate of soul and body, the man, weaves or builds. So we ought also to say, not that the soul feels anger, pity, love, hatred, etc., or that the soul learns, reasons, recollects, etc., but that the man with his soul does these things. The actual movement throughout these processes is not in the soul, but in the body, sometimes going to the soul (as in sensible perception), sometimes proceeding from the soul to the body (as in the case of reminiscence). Defects in the soul arise from defects in the bodily organism. This is not less true of the *nous*, or intellective soul than of the sentient soul.

"The varieties of soul are distributed into successive stages, gradually narrowing in extension and enlarging in comprehension; the first or lowest stage being co-extensive with the whole, but connoting only two or three simple attributes; the second or next above, connoting all these and more besides, but denoting only part of the individuals denoted by the first. The third, connoting all this and more, but denoting yet fewer individuals, and so on forward." This lower stage is co-existent with life, including both plants and animals.

The nutritive soul connotes only nutrition, growth, decay, and generation of another individual. The sentient soul, belonging to animals, but not belonging to plants, connotes all the functions and faculties of the nutritive soul, and sensible perception (at least in its rudest shape) besides. "We¹ proceed onward in the same direction, taking in additional faculties,—the movent, appetitive, phantastic, noetic soul, and thus diminishing the total of individuals denoted. But each higher variety of soul continues to possess all the faculties of the lower. Thus the sentient soul cannot exist without comprehending all the faculties of the nutritive, though the nutritive exists (in plants) without any admixture of the sentient. Again, the sentient soul does not necessarily possess either memory, imagination or intellect (*nous*); but no soul can be either imaginative or noetic without being sentient as well as nutritive. The noetic soul, as the highest of all, retains in itself all the lower faculties; but these are found to exist apart from it."

Plato's system takes note of three essences, these mingling together form a soul. Aristotle recognizes but one, with different forms of manifestation. The *nous* is not connected with or dependent upon any given bodily organs or movements appropriated to itself; this distinguishes it from the sentient and nutrient parts, which are localized to a certain extent.

¹Grote: Aristotle, p. 461.

The sentient soul is complete from birth, while the *nous* or the noetic soul enters from without and emanates from the divine celestial substance, the region of Form; the celestial body surrounding the cosmos, and every form that animates matter derive its vitalizing influence from it. But the *nous* belongs essentially to the divine; it comes from without, being a small fraction of the whole soul. There are but few men in whom it is much developed. It is put into action by the abstract and universal, in a certain sense within the soul itself. Of the *nous* the *Intellectus agens* is the constructive function, and the *Intellectus Patiens* the receptive function; the first deals with the universal, it alone being immortal, while the latter agency ceases with the existence of the body. The animal soul is differentiated from the vegetable, principally, because of a greater degree of concentration. The fundamental activity of the soul is thought.

After Plato and Aristotle, no new systems of Greek philosophy were set forth. Greek civilization had begun to decay; the later philosophers were content to follow along in the lines of one or the other of the two great leaders. "Criticism, appropriation, readjustment and remodelling" occupied the minds of the later Greeks and early Romans.

The two schools most sharply distinguished are those of the Stoics and Epicureans. With the decline of the Grecian states, philosophy took on a practical turn; and with Grecian helplessness we have Stoic apathy and Epicurean self-contentment, —peace of mind being the only way to happiness. The central point of the Stoic doctrines is a certain ethical standard, the ideal of the wise man. The moral¹ conduct of man is the chief business of philosophy.

"The matter^a or substance of which all things are made is corporeal," it is infinitely divisible, everything is subject to change. Heat and cold are the two active elements. In their materialistic view of the world they regard the soul as corporeal. Whatever influences the body, or is united with it, or is itself influenced by it and again separated from it, must be corporeal. It has extension in three dimensions over the body, and whatever has three dimensions is corporeal. Animal life, the cause of thought and motion, is kept in health and nurtured by the breath, therefore the mind is nothing but fiery breath. For some Stoics the soul is fire or breath, or warm breath diffused throughout the body. The warm breath is connected with the blood, the soul being fed by its vapors as the stars are fed by vapors from the earth. One part of the

¹ Zeller: Stoics, Epicureans and Sceptics, p. 56.

² *Ibid.*, p. 194, *seq.*

soul is transmitted to the young in the seed. There arises, by development within the womb, first the soul of a plant; this becomes the soul of a living creature, after birth, by the action of the outer air. Some thought the soul must reside in the breast, because the voice bearing the thought arises in that part of the body; others thought it was located in the head. For the former location, eight parts of it were recognized; the *hegemonicon* or governing part, situated in the breast, the five senses, the faculty of speech, and the generative force. The soul is a unity, reason or the *hegemonicon* is the primary power; the other powers are parts of this,—derived from it. Feeling and desire are also derived from it. The individual soul is related to the soul of the universe as a part to the whole. It does not possess activity independent of the world-soul, neither may it last till the end of the world's course.

The Epicureans likewise held a materialistic view. According to their system of philosophy, knowledge of natural causes is the only means of liberating the soul from superstition. This is the value of natural science; the thought of God and the fear of death compelling us to study nature. Bodily reality is the only form, corporeal,¹ the only substance. The origin of the world is the result of atomic unity. The soul is a body, but is composed of the finest, lightest and most easily moved atoms; this is proven by the speed of thought, instantaneous dissolution of the soul at death, and the fact that the soulless or dead body loses no weight. For Epicurus² the soul is the cause of feeling; the elements of it are received by the child from the parent's soul at the time of generation, it is spread over the whole body and grows as the body grows. The rational part has its seat in the breast; the irrational part is diffused as a principle of life over the whole body. Mental activity, sensation and perception, the motion of the will and the mind belong to the rational part. The mind may be cheerful while the irrational soul may feel pain, or the latter may be lost by the mutilation of the body—without detriment to the rational soul. The soul cannot exist when its connection with the body is severed, its light atoms are dispersed in a moment. When the soul is destroyed the body is also destroyed, for it cannot exist without the soul. Atomic particles thrown off by bodies, come in contact with our bodies and cause sensations.

Among the Eclectics, the later philosophers attempted to blend the different schools. Asclepiades thought the soul to be the whole compounded of all the senses, with a substratum, the *pneuma*, consisting of light round particles. Posidonius

¹Zellar: Stoics, Epicureans and Sceptics, p. 439.

²*Ibid.*, p. 454.

thought the emotions arose, not from the rational soul, but from courage and desire, two separate faculties, distinct from reason. Cicero regarded the soul as an emanation from the Deity, an essence of supernatural origin.

If we glance back briefly over Greek philosophy as a whole, we find, in this retrospective view, a general tendency toward idealism.

The early cosmologists made no break with their mythical religion, but sought rather the basis of matter, the enduring part of it; or, in other words, since matter was considered to be animated, they sought that on which the life principle depended. A gradual dualism was formed, which resulted in the idealism of Plato, the stages of which may be traced as follows: (1) the teachings of Empedocles, embracing the theory of opposites; (2) the form of Pythagoras, believed to represent dualism; (3) the *nous* of Anaxagoras, in which the mind was predominant over matter.

Explanations of mental phenomena tend to sever the connection of soul with the life function and associate it with mind. The development of ethics has been instrumental in this change of idea. Localization of a part of the soul in the region of the abdomen, harmonizes with the modern theory of the emotions. Greek theorists regarded the soul as a substance, many of them taught that it was composed of particles of matter of some kind.

THEOLOGICAL IDEAS OF THE SOUL.

Any historical study of the soul beginning with the decline of Greek Philosophy, must recognize the following principles: (1) religious ideas of the soul are oldest, are found among all primitive peoples, have existed at all stages of civilization, and form whatever ideas of the soul most civilized peoples have today; (2) from time to time certain philosophers have attempted to define the soul on the basis of the relationship between God, the universe and man; (3) more recent psychologists have attempted to state the relation existing between the soul and the mind. Keeping these principles in mind, the writer has thought best to treat the subject under the following headings: Theological, Philosophical, and Psychological theories of the soul.

THE THEOLOGICAL IDEA. The conception of the soul formed as the result of religious teaching is more common than that derived from any other source. That is, while there may be no generalized idea of it in which all people agree, the masses of the people, if they have any formulated idea of its existence, have probably gotten it through their religious teachings, it being in definite relations to their idea of God. The idea in-

volves a material substance of some kind, which, as such, continues to exist after the death of the individual. In fact, so general is such a belief among religious peoples (and little removed from the primitive idea yet), especially among Christians, that here in this crude yet general belief a great soil or matrix is formed which has almost become inherent. The theological standpoint is least removed from that of primitive man, is more generalized than any other, and so naturally falls first in the line of treatment. Hagenbach¹ observes: "The inquiry into the origin of the human soul, and the mode of its union with the body seems to be purely metaphysical, and to have no bearing upon religion. But, in a religious point of view, it is always of importance that the soul should be considered as a *creature of God*. This doctrine was maintained by the Catholic church in opposition to the Gnostic and heretical theory of emanations."

An historical treatment of the subject, from the monotheistic point of view existing in Christian religions to-day, has more meaning if we take up the threads of connection that lead back to Grecian philosophy, and especially those that lead to Jewish theology. At the time of the Christian era these two lines of influence had begun to mingle. This is noticeable in the material ideas of the later Stoics; the doctrines of this school is an elective one, many of their teachers are essentially Christian, while they attempt to cling to Grecian philosophy. The immediate influence of this school was most potent on the early Christians. The stoics taught that the Pneuma (*πνευμα*) is corporeal, yet it has the attributes of mind. In this is a trace of the influence of Hebrew doctrines. For the latter the word *Ruach*, corresponding to Pneuma (*πνευμα*) had a material meaning, *i. e.*, it meant something that God breathed into man. It was for them a semi-force, a vital element at least, something that could exist apart from God. Philosophers before the time of the Stoics had regarded the Pneuma (*πνευμα*) as the vital force of the body, and in fact the soul itself; but the latter class looked upon everything that is real as being corporeal, and the human soul as a fragment of God. The main channel, so to speak, of Grecian philosophy culminated in the teachings of Plato, terminating in idealism; this line of thought was further worked out in Neo-platonism. The systems of Greek philosophy, condemned and pointed out the errors of the early Greek religions, but offered no substitute. The effect of this was that the later Greeks, without a satisfactory religion, were ready to take over and work into their systems of philosophy, what seemed best of the teachings of Christ. Stoic² philosophy rep-

¹ History of Doctrine, Vol. I, p. 211.

² Drummond: Jewish Alexandrian Philos., Vol. I, p. 131.

resents a transition; the two streams of influence mingle and were brought together by them.

The doctrine of the Logos reached its highest development with them prior to the Jewish and Christian influences. Their later doctrine is really a passage from philosophy to religion; from a system of thought elaborately worked out to the bold declaration of truths borne in upon the mind, announced as the word of God, but without system. The work of outlining and harmonizing these conflicting streams of thought constituted the chief debates and discussions of the church Fathers. Their conception of the soul must harmonize with the teachings of the Bible, the ideas previously held by the Jews, and the Christian concept in general. This concept represented it as something similar to breath, as something material that might influence or be influenced for good or evil, or that might endure suffering, or enjoy pleasures.

Some of the Church fathers accepted the Neo-platonic doctrines, this being true especially of those located in Greece and Egypt; while the Latin Fathers, as Tertullian, Arnobius and Lactantius, rejected philosophy as a heathen product, which must be avoided. But the¹ very opposition of Christian doctrine to early philosophy compelled the Fathers to study the latter to offset attacks and in this way it came more readily to be reduced to dogma, to be formulated and systematized.

Of the different ideas of the soul's origin, Alger² mentions six, four of which have been held at different periods and debated by the Church Fathers. The first he mentions is that of emanation. This theory is constructed from the results of observation by analogy. It is a wide-spread belief of the present day, being one of the teachings of Hindu philosophy. Some of the analogies on which it is based are: the annual developments of vegetable life from the bosom of the earth; the preservation of the properties of drops of water taken from a fountain; the separation of the air into breaths, and the soil into atoms; the utterances of tone gradually dying away into echoes; the radiation of light from a central origin, etc. The second theory of the soul's origin is that of a previous existence. This view was wide-spread among oriental thinkers, also among Greek philosophers and some of the early Church fathers. There are two forms of the doctrine: one, that the soul has existed below man and is on an ascent upward; the other, that the former existence of it has been above that of man and that voluntarily, or from some cause it has descended to the rank of man. The third view is that the soul is created directly by the volun-

¹ Weber : *History of Phil.*, p. 186.

² The Doctrine of a Future Life, pp. 410.

tary power of God. The ideas of this theory have been modified at times, some holding that all souls were created by a divine decree at the beginning of the world, while later theologians of the middle ages claimed that God breathes a soul into each new being. A fourth theory, held by Tertullian, was that of Traduction; that is, that all human souls have been brought over from the soul of Adam. The two views of the theory are: (1) All souls are developed out of the one substance of Adam's soul; (2) the eating of the forbidden fruit corrupted all the vital fluids of the original Mother Eve. All these theories have their objections. Viewed from the standpoint of modern science, some of them seem absurd, yet they served a valuable purpose in their time and place.

Draper¹ notes that there are two systems of philosophy. One recognizes a personal God, who exists apart and creates the immortal souls of men; the other recognizes an Impersonal Intelligence—an indeterminate God, from whom the soul emerges and to whom it again returns. Under the latter system, beings are created from nothing or developed through an evolutionary process.

Philo² the Jew was one of the earliest of those whose writings tended to unite Judaism and Hellenism. He taught that we possess life or soul in common with the irrational animals; but that the power of intelligence is peculiar to mind. Man is a dual, soul and body, and forms the borderland between the mortal and the immortal, the earthly and the divine. The soul possesses three properties: perception, by means of which the mind receives impressions through the senses, mental representations, and impulse. Impressions received through the senses are stamped on the mind like a ring or seal, like an impress made upon wax, and so are capable of being reproduced. They are retained until oblivion. Impulses fall either under the heading of aversion, or of desire. Man differs from the brute in that he is "two-natured," animal and man. The animal shares the vital power with the irrational creatures; man possesses the rational principle in addition to the vital element, and these constitute the soul. Like Plato he distinguishes three parts of the soul, one part being rational, a second, high spirited, third, he represents as the seat of desire. The irrational soul is explained in a way that harmonizes with the view expressed by Moses³ in the Old Testament, *viz.*: "The soul of all flesh is blood." Mind is God to the irrational soul. This rational principle, *nous*, mind, was thought to consist of an "ethereal fire nature," yet spirit (with which it was

¹ Conflict between Religion and Science, p. 140.

² Jewish Alexandrian Philosophy. Drummond. Vol. I, pp. 314-59.

³ Gen. IX, 4.

supposed to be in connection) was regarded as incorporeal. Justin Martyr, Athenagoras and Theophilus were three of the early Roman Fathers who lived soon after the time of Philo. They recognized in the teachings of the Greek philosophers the activity of the Divine Logos. The early Greek writers, McConnell thinks,¹ brought to the new religion the Platonic idea that the individual soul is indestructible, is, in fact, an articulate portion of the substance of the mind of God. Those of Roman antecedent having no inherited beliefs in a future life of any kind were better prepared to comprehend the truth of Christ. The interaction of all these fragments of earlier philosophy produced a confusion and uncertainty of mind which was not clarified for five centuries. For Justin Martyr body and soul constitute one whole; like oxen they made one team, being able to accomplish alone as little as one ox in plowing. He expects the resurrection both of the just and the unjust. A proof of this is the recognized fact that departed human souls are even now in a state of sensation; they may be evoked by Magi and Seers.

Theophilus² expresses himself thus: "If thou sayest, 'show me thy God,' I answer, 'show me thy man, and I will show thee my God.' Show me first whether the eyes of the soul see and the ears of the heart hear; for as the eyes of the body perceive earthly things, light and darkness, white and black, beauty and deformity, etc., so the ears of the heart and the eyes of the soul can perceive God. God is seen by those who can see Him when they open the eyes of their soul. . . . The eyes of the soul are darkened by sin, even by their sinful actions. Like a bright mirror, man must have a pure soul. If there be any rust on the mirror, man cannot see the reflection of his countenance in it; likewise, if there be sin in man, he cannot see God."

Clement of Alexandria mentions a tenfold division³ of man analogous to the decalogue, the basis of the division being the more general one of body, soul, and spirit. He follows the example of Plato and divides the soul into three faculties.

Writers of Christian philosophy have usually indicated certain well defined periods of time as characteristic of some particular phase of the subject. There are several of these classifications. According to Hagenbach the first period in the development of Christian philosophy, extending to the death of Origen, is that of Apologetics; the second, from 254 A. D. to 730, is the age of polemics.

In his philosophical teaching Origen was an idealist and in part

¹ The Evolution of Immortality, p. 46.

² Hagenbach: History of Doctrine, Vol. I, p. 136.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 210.

represented the Platonic idea and also the doctrine of Aristotle, while at the same time he was conforming to Jewish theology. He believed in the pre-existence of the soul, and regarded its incarnation as a punishment for former sins. Matter, he thought, is not external; it is the root of evil in man. The Bible was held to be inspired. By inspiration¹ he meant "not the pouring in of foreign thoughts, but an exaltation of the powers of the soul, whereby prophets were elevated to a knowledge of the truth." The soul is immortal, the resurrected body perhaps takes the shape of a sphere. This latter view was also held by some of his followers. As a proof of the pre-existence of the soul he cited scripture in the following: ²"If the soul of man is formed only with the body, how could Jacob supplant his brother in the womb, and John leap in the womb at the salutation of Mary?"

The ideas of Tertullian³ were in many respects opposed to those of Origen. He is regarded as one of the Christian philosophers, though he was materialistic in his conception, and taught Stoic doctrine. He recognized two parts of man: soul and body; both material, and both having the same form. The soul, he thought, is delicate, luminous, and aeriform, in substance; for if it were not material it could not be acted upon by the body, nor would it be capable of suffering, and its existence would not depend upon the nourishing of the latter. The soul of the child comes from the semen of the father, like a shoot from the parent-stock of a plant. Every human soul is a branch of Adam's soul. The spiritual qualities of the parents are transmitted to the children, hence the universal sinfulness of the children of Adam. Associated with the name of Tertullian we have the doctrine of Traducianism, he being generally regarded as the founder of this. The doctrine is, that souls are propagated by souls as bodies are by bodies. This was a prevailing belief until the time of Anselm. The Apostolic⁴ Constitutions teach that in the primal beginning, likewise after conception, God creates the soul into that which is becoming man.

The teachings of Origen and Tertullian may be contrasted as follows: The former was an idealist to the extent of abstracting everything from God that would tend to bring him down towards men. God is animate, but sustains and fills the world. The term "man" is often used for man's spiritual part, conveying the idea that man consists essentially of soul. The soul pre-exists; death by sin is separation from God; the

¹ Hagenbach: *op. cit.*, p. 120.

² *Ibid.*, p. 212.

³ Ueberweg: *Hist. of Phil.*, p. 305.

⁴ Delitzsch: *System of Bib. Psychology*, p. 129.

blessed dwell in the aerial regions, paradise is a happy island; after death the soul passes through successive stages of happiness, arriving at last, after the final judgment, to the perfection of blessedness, the Kingdom of Heaven. This represents the idealism of the east, peculiar to the Alexandrian school. Tertullian uses figures from the human form to describe God: eyes, ears, tongue, hands, feet, etc., being associated by him. The soul is corporeal, having the outlines of the body,—it does not pre-exist; it is reflected in man, and is immortal, the body and soul are united after the final resurrection. Tertullian, having been born in Carthage, reflects more truly the state of affairs as found in the West.

The doctrines of Arnobius and Lactantius may be considered together, since these two African Fathers were associated as teacher and pupil. The former opposed the Platonic doctrine of the reminiscence of knowledge, and denied that the soul is by nature immortal, for this must be an act of God's grace; the latter believed in the doctrine of Creationism. His belief in immortality he justified on the grounds: (1) of the testimony of the scriptures; (2) since God is incorporeal, and can exist without a body, we may believe as much for the soul. The soul is born with the body, and as opposed to the idea of Traducianism, he argued that intelligent parents sometimes have stupid children, and *vice versa*. The shaping influence of ideas, as those expressed, is often found in the ground work of a larger movement,—they may represent merely the reflection of other forces at work—such an one was Neo-platonism. This movement in thought was the culmination of Greek philosophy. The germ deposited by Philo was developing into a vital theology and an endeavor to found a new church was being made. The doctrines set forth in Neo-platonism were chiefly ethical; God was defined as an abstraction, and unlike the Christian movement was impersonally related to man. Plotinus was the chief exponent. His teachings and the teachings of Neo-platonism in general, had its influence on church doctrines, on the side of idealizing thought and leading toward mysticism. Plotinus¹ thought the soul was the image *ειδολα* and product of the *nous*, just as the *nous* is of the One. The soul is inferior to the *nous*, though none the less divine, and endowed with generative force. Coming forth from the *nous* (it includes in itself the world of ideas) the soul extends itself, as it were, into the corporeal, just as the point extended becomes a line; there is, therefore, in the soul an ideal, indivisible element, and a divisible element which goes to produce the material world. The soul is an immaterial substance, not a body,

¹ Ueberweg: Hist. of Phil., Vol. I, p. 249.

not the harmony nor the entelechy of the body, but inseparable from the latter, since not only the *nous*, but also memory and even the faculty of perception and the psychical force which molds the body, are separable from the body. The soul permeates the body as fire permeates the air.

It is more correct to say that the body is in the soul than that the soul is in the body; there is, therefore, a portion of the soul in which there is no body, a portion for whose functioning the co-operation of the body is unnecessary. But neither are the sensuous faculties lodged in the body, whether in its individual parts or in the body as a whole; they are merely present with the body, the soul lending to each bodily organ the force necessary for the execution of its functions. Thus the soul is present not only in the individual parts of the body, but in the whole body, and present everywhere in its entity, not divided among the different parts of the body; it is entirely in the whole body, and entirely in every part. The soul¹ is divided, because it is in all parts of the body, and it is undivided, because it is entirely in all parts and in every part. The soul is *per se* indivisible, being divided only as related to the bodies into which it enters since these could not receive it if it remained undivided. It is essentially in the *nous*, as the *nous* is in the *one*; but the soul contains the body. The Divine extends from the One to the soul. The soul, in virtue of its mobility, begets the corporeal.

The soul stands between the *nous* and the phenomenal world; the *nous* penetrates and illumines it, but the soul itself comes in contact with the phenomenal world. Its nature and definition identifies it with a world soul, composed of many of like nature. As pure intelligence it has neither appetite nor desire; the part which is inferior to intelligence, and capable of having desire, proceeds from the intelligible world. The soul, at first, shares with the universal soul the care of administering the entire world, without entering it; afterwards wishing to administer part of it only, it separates itself from the universal soul and passes into a body. But even then it does not give itself entirely to the body, for a part of it remains outside of the body; thus its intelligence remains impassible.

Plotinus taught the doctrine of Emanation. This he presented somewhat as follows: the universal soul embraces a multitude of individual souls; these being desirous of a separate existence, independent, separate themselves from the soul,—the great common principle—and enter a body. These individual parts are perfect in themselves. They finally return, after their mission is fulfilled, to this absolute unity. This

¹ Harnack : *Lehrbuch der Dogmengeschichte*, p. 776.

doctrine is found in the Buddhistic teachings, according to which the soul gradually reaches Nirvana. Averroes presented it among the Saracens. In their religion¹ it is claimed that the intelligent principle or soul at death is absorbed in the universal mind, or active intelligence, the mundane soul,—which is God, from which it emanated. The individual, or passive, or subjective intellect is an emanation from the universal, and constitutes the soul of man. In one sense it ends with the body, in a higher it endures, absorbed by the world soul, in unity with it. Vedic theology teaches that “There is in truth but one Deity, the supreme spirit; he is of the same nature as the soul of man.” The Institutes of Menu affirm that the soul emanates from the all-pervading Intellect, so is destined to be reabsorbed.

Since the work of the early Fathers was largely that of presenting and defending Christianity, it dealt more with the historical past and what had been taught than with a strict analysis of their own experiences. The first one to really begin an analysis of the mind and the inner experiences, was Gregory of Nyssa. He was followed soon after by Augustine, of whom it was said that he established the Christian doctrine of the soul once for all. Gregory of Nyssa is considered by some² the most important of the Oriental Church Fathers. He regarded man as the highest unfolding of psychical life, “the crown of creation, its master and its king.” The idealization of the world of sense was the chief feature in his analysis of this psychical life, nature was transformed into psychical terms, reality was recognized in spiritual ideas. The soul is a “self-sufficient substance”, which is always in motion, and to which rest would be annihilation. It fills the body not materially, but dynamically, as light penetrates the air. It is not properly speaking in the body, the body is in it. The power³ of thought is not an attribute of matter, if it were, matter would show itself endowed with it, combine the elements, and form works of art. As separable from matter, the soul in its substantial existence is like God, resembling him as a copy resembles the original. Since it is simple and uncompounded, the soul survives the dissolution of the composite body, whose scattered elements it continues and will continue to accompany, as if watching over its property, until the resurrection, when it will clothe itself in them anew. The essence of the soul does not contain anger and desire; these belong to its varying states; they are not originally a part of ourselves and we must get rid

¹ Draper: *Conflict Between Religion and Science*, p. 139.

² Windelband : *Hist. of Phil.*, p. 254.

³ Janet and Seailles: *Hist. of the Problems of Philos.* Vol. II., p. 193.

⁴ De Hom: pp. 192-206.

of them, they mark us with the brutes. Our bodies are like the coats of skins with which our first parents were clothed after the fall; they are transient.

The consummation of all these beliefs and doctrines was reached in Augustine. In all times the masses of the people have been led in their beliefs by the advance guard,—a power usually centered in one person. St. Augustine represents the high water mark of his era, and at the same time marks the beginning of a new. The only theologian of the practical Roman type of mind that had produced thus far a philosophical consideration of his faith. It has been said of him that “No¹ single man has ever exercised such a power over the Christian Church and no one mind ever made such an impression upon Christian thought.” If the doctrines of the church have any influence in moulding our theological ideas, then Augustine has had a great influence. Dogma was perfected with his system. He taught² that the soul is immaterial, there are found in it only functions, such as thought, knowing, willing and remembrance. It is a substance or subject and not a mere attribute of the body. It is spiritual because it is the subject of thought, that is, it cannot be an attribute of that which does not think. It feels each affection of the body at that point where the affection takes place, without being obliged to move itself to that place; it is, therefore, wholly present within the entire body, and in each part of it,—while the corporeal with each of its parts is only in one place. A body has only figure, one form; it cannot become the figure and form of another body; the mind can in loving, love both itself and that which is other than itself; in knowing, know itself and that which is other than itself; hence, while memory, intellect and will share in the substantiality of the mind, they differ in this respect from mere accidents, as color, or form, of a substratum. Understanding can know itself, memory can remember that we possess memory, *i. e.*, the soul is conscious of itself as such and each of its parts. The union of soul and body cannot be scientifically explained for man is, as it were, a third substance formed out of two heterogeneous substances. The body does not act on the soul, it is the soul in the body acting on itself. The metaphysics of Augustine is built up on the knowledge of the finite personality. The three aspects of the psychic reality are idea, judgment, and will, and from these he seeks to gain an analogical idea of the mystery of the Trinity. Will is the central element of consciousness. “The leading³ motive

¹ Very Rev. J. Tulloch: *Enc. Brit.*, Vol. III, p. 75.

² Ueberweg: *Hist. of Phil.*, Vol. I, p. 342.

³ Windelband: *Hist. of Phil.*, p. 281.

in this is doubtless the man's (Augustine) own experience; himself a nature ardent and strong in will, as he examined and scrutinized his own personality he came upon the will as its inmost core." The becoming conscious of an act of perception is an act of the will. Physical attention and likewise activity of inner sense have a dependence on the will. Whether we bring our states and actions to consciousness, the thinking of the intellect, judging and reasoning,—all these is determined by the will for it determines the "direction and the end according to which the data of outer or inner experience are to be brought under the general truths of rational insight."

The existence¹ of the soul is proved by thought, consciousness and memory. If one is in doubt as to his existence, to doubt, means to think, and to think *is* to exist. If the soul were made of fire, or air, or any other material, we would know it by an immediate perception, its substance differs from all known matter, and matter in general, for it contains the notions of the point, the line, length, breadth, and other conceptions, which are incorporeal. The immortality of it follows from its rational nature. Reason brings the soul into communion with the eternal truth, in fact the soul and truth are, as it were, one substance. The human soul is passive, receptive, and contemplative, death to it means its separation from truth. The senses furnish it knowledge, of sensible things, the spirit is instrumental in giving the soul knowledge of a moral or a religious character, a terrestrial light surrounds the corporeal body, a spiritual light environs the soul; this interior light is God himself dwelling within us. The history of mankind is divided into six periods corresponding to the six days of creation, in the last of these we live.

There are general ideas which have the same objective validity for every one, and are not like the sense perceptions conditioned by subjective conditions. Mathematical truths are of this kind, as $2+3=5$; the higher metaphysical truth belongs to this class, *i. e.*, it is truth in itself, absolute. This absolute truth demanded by the mind is God himself. Reasoning in this way Augustine is said to have given the first proof of the existence of God. The principal points of his doctrine may be stated as follows: The soul exists, it can be proven, it is a substance, its origin is in God, it is immortal and does not pre-exist; it grows from two sources, the external world and the spiritual world; separation from truth is sin, its basis is in the will.

The activity of the church in forming doctrine ceased with the creed set forth by Augustine. Adjustment internally is the

¹ Siebeck : Geschichte der Psychologie, Part II, pp. 381-397.

next step. How far the influence of Augustine's doctrine would extend was not comprehended at that time. But to the time of the Reformation, in church controversies, reformers identified themselves in many instances as in favor of or opposed to certain of Augustine's theses. Mention may be made of two or three of Augustine's contemporaries or successors. They contribute little, but it is interesting to note that they take up the threads of analysis.

Nemesius¹ discussed the soul from a psychological standpoint; it is an immaterial substance, involved in incessant and self-produced motion. From it the body receives its motion. It existed before it entered the body. It is eternal, like all suprasensible things. It is not true that new souls are constantly coming into existence, whether by generation or by direct creation. The opinion is also false that the world is destined to be destroyed when the number of souls shall have become complete. Nemesius rejects the doctrine of the world-soul and of metempsychosis; in considering the separate faculties of the soul, in regard to the freedom of the will he follows Aristotle.

Claudianus Mamertus² claimed that all creatures, and therefore, the soul among them, fall within the sphere of the categories; the soul is a substance and has quality; but it is not, like material substances, subject to all the categories; in particular, quantity in the usual spatial sense of the term, cannot be predicted of it; it has magnitude, but only as regards virtue and intelligence. The motion of the soul takes place only in time and not like that of material objects, in time and space together. The world, in order to be complete, must contain all species of existences, the immaterial, therefore, as well as the material. The former of these resembles God by its non-quantitative and spaceless character, and is superior to material objects, while, by its creature-ship and its subjection to the category of quality and to motion in time, it differs from the unqualitative and eternal God, and resembles the material world. The soul is not by, but environs the body, which it holds together.

Cassiodorus³ thought that man alone has a substantial and immortal soul, the life of the irrational animals has its seat in their blood. The human soul, in virtue of its rationality, is not, indeed, a part of God, for it is not unchangeable, but it can determine itself to evil, and at the same time is capable, through virtue, of making itself like God; it is created to be an image of God. It is spiritual for it is able to know spiritual things. The soul is present, in its entirety in each of its parts;

¹ Siebeck : *Geschichte der Psychologie*, p. 398-400.

² Ueberweg : *Hist of Phil.*, Vol. I, p. 354.

³ Ueberweg : *Hist. of Phil.*, Vol. I, p. 304.

it is everywhere present in the body and not limited by a spatial form.

Taking a general view of this early period, embracing the time of all the church fathers, Spencer notes:¹

"The majority of the early fathers believed that the soul was corporeal. Amongst the pagan writers there was a progressive effort to conceive of the soul more purely; some made it a vapor, a breath, a fire. The same tendency existed among the Christians; 'still the idea of the materiality of the soul was more general among the Christian doctors from the first to the fifth century, than among the pagan philosophers.' It was against them that certain fathers maintained its materiality, so that it should be rewarded or punished after death. In Gaul—Faustus, Bishop of Riez, in the fifth century, maintained that God alone is incorporeal, and that the soul occupies a place, is enclosed in a body, quits the body at death, and re-enters it by the resurrection."

Scholasticism offered little in advance over what the Patristic fathers had set forth; on the whole was rather a relapse to former ideas. Controversies as to the details of a broader doctrine often occupied the best minds. Augustine's analyses and methods, the translation of Aristotle's metaphysics and a general survey of the Greek culture and philosophy, brought forward the problem of Being, initiated the controversy over universals, and evoked a discussion of the questions of nominalism and realism. These questions pertaining to the reality of the individual and the universe, all had their influence; this much was a fact, whatever and wherever reality exists, since the soul's abode hereafter is with God, there must be a similarity, in composition and nature, or whatever of his being exists in man; that constitutes the immortal part. Christianity in the earlier centuries was allied to the idealism of Plato; the return to Aristotle gave rise, during the mediæval period, to the opposed doctrines of nominalism and realism. This dispute can be traced back to fundamental ideas set forth by these philosophers.

Erigena, during the ninth century, taught² that everything living comes from something that has previously existed. The visible world is an emanation from God. The "soul of the world" of the Greeks is nature. The particular life of the individual is therefore a part of the general existence of the mundane soul. All things return to God, the soul of the "universal Intellect." The soul returns to its previous state. Sometimes the doctrine of Plato prevailed during the Middle

¹ *Outlines of Sociology*, No. VIII, p. 121.¹

² *Draper: Conflict Between Science and Relig.*, p. 125-6.

Ages, and sometimes that of Aristotle. Bernard of Chartres, and William of Conches of the twelfth century were followers of Plato. The former¹ declared the world soul to be an entelechy which issued as if by emanation from the divine mind. This soul has given shape to nature. With Albert Magnus, Thomas Aquinas, Occam and Scotus of the thirteenth century a new era opens. Industrial and internal conditions of society were coming more into conformity with peace relations. The church was gradually losing its hold on society as a regulative force and signs of the Renaissance were being manifested.

Albert Magnus² thought "only that whose existence is self-derived has by its very nature eternal being; every creature is derived from nothing; and would therefore perish, if not upheld by the eternal essence of God. By virtue of its community with God, every human soul is an heir of immortality. The active intellect is a part of the soul, for in every man it is the form-giving principle, in which other individuals cannot share. This same thinking and form-giving principle bears in itself the forces, which Aristotle calls the vegetative, sensitive, appetitive, and motive faculties, and hence the latter are, like the former, capable of being separated from the body, and are immortal." The soul is the entelechy of the body, yet since certain of its functions are not connected with its organs, it is separate at these points, and at all points from the body. Man, in so far as he is man, is intellect; the highest stage of life is attained by knowledge, the participation in the divine. "With³ the five senses and the *sensus communis* are said to be connected the *vis imaginative* and *aestimativa*, which are common to all animals; further, the *phantasia*, which at least the higher animals have; and finally the *memoria*." The *pars rationalis* of the soul is unchangeable, independent of matter, receptive; the intellect is the part of virtue of which man is immortal. This system so elaborately begun by Albert was completed in its different phases by Thomas Aquinas. The theological aspect was elaborately worked out by him. Both men are followers of Aristotle, the latter, it will be noted, sought to bring the teachings of Aristotle in closer *rapprochement* with the church.

For Thomas⁴ the embryo, from the beginning of life, possesses a soul, but it is only a vegetative one. This soul disappears to make room for another; the second is both vegetative and sensitive, this yielding its place to a third, an intellectual soul, which includes the other two. It is a form without matter,

¹ Ueberweg: Hist. of Phil., Vol. I, p. 398.

² Ueberweg: Hist. of Phil., Vol. I, p. 398.

³ Erdmann: Hist. of Phil., Vol. I, p. 406.

⁴ Janet and Seailles: Hist. of the Problems of Phil., Vol. II, p. 195.

the entelechy of the body. The vegetable and sensitive souls are present in the embryo before the rational soul appears, this comes from without, is created immediately and fuses with the other two. All beings except God were created by God; the angels were the first and the noblest creatures and, like the angels, the souls of men are immortal forms. The rational soul has an existence apart from the body.

The vegetative and animal faculties depend only in their temporal activity on bodily organs. The intellect alone works without an organ, because the form of the organ would hinder the correct knowledge of other forms than himself. God and the active and passive human intellects are related to each other as are the sun, its light and the eye. The forms, which the passive intellect takes from the external world through the senses, are rendered really intelligible by the active intellect—there is no innate knowledge. The human soul does not have a pre-existence, but it does continue to live after death; is not destroyed by the dissolution of the body. Immortality belongs not merely to the thinking power, but also to the lower powers; the soul forms for itself after death a new body similar to its former one.

Thomas pointed out the distinction between the *anima sensitiva* and *anima intellectiva* in such a way as to harmonize the disputed points of Creativism and Traducianism. He regarded the *sensitiva* as a natural product while the *intellectiva* is a creation of God. The angels have the highest intelligences, the moving of the heavenly bodies is their first work. The *intellectus possibilis* is a part of the soul and is determined individually—it is the capacity of actively seizing the forms—and is immortal. The active understanding as well as the *intellectus possibilis* is a part of the soul and these two fill the whole body; if it were not so, man would not be responsible for his thoughts, which are the product of the *intellectus speculativus*, nor for his acts, which are products of the *intellectus practicus*. Memory does not survive death. The soul is an intelligence having form (substantial), and as such may survive the body. The existence of a soul in the bodiless form is contrary to its nature, so it becomes rehabilitated, the new body is called spiritual because it is subordinate to the soul; there may be bodily punishments after death.

With St. Thomas the philosophy of the Christian school, scholasticism, reaches its highest point. Weber¹ notes that scholasticism is first influenced by Platonism through the mediation of St. Augustine; from the thirteenth century on, it gradually suffers from the influence of Aristotle's philosophy.

¹History of Philosophy, p. 202.

The latter period is further divided into one in which Aristotle is interpreted as a realist, and later as a nominalist. With the decline of scholasticism, theological discussion, as constituting the whole of philosophy, became less and less the dominant motive; the church no longer had a controlling influence. New interests and discoveries tended to dissipate thought, and offer new channels, aside from the purely theological view. These changes in the attitude of the people toward the church continued to grow with the development of scientific ideas, and on account of the fixed condition of affairs resulted finally in those disruptions of the church which have occurred from time to time since the mediæval period. Theological dogma established by the early fathers has changed little regarding the ideas of the soul, and St. Thomas, whose doctrines are still vital in the church, agrees very closely with Aristotle. Scholasticism practically came to a close with William of Occam; with the growth of science since that period, the views of life have constantly enlarged as discovery has progressed. New material and discovery have tended to limit the influence and work of the church and set it in its proper sphere. The doctrine of William of Occam may be summarized briefly as follows:

The ¹feeling soul (*anima sensitiva*) and the soul as form-giving principle (*forma corporis*), *i. e.*, the vegetable soul — of the body, are not identical with the thinking mind (*anima intellectiva*). The sensitive soul is extended, and is joined in a corporeal manner to the body, all parts of which it fills (circumscription), so that its parts dwell in separate parts of the same body. But the intellective soul is another substance, separable from the body and joined with it definitive, so that it is entirely present in every part. He argued for the separate substantial existence of the intellect, as founded on the antagonism between sense and reason.

A hasty glance at modern theological views will be taken, yet they do not reveal many new ideas. The Saracen view of the soul, as expressed by Al-Gazzali, is that "God has created the spirit of man out of a drop of his own light; its destiny is to return to him."

The question as to the origin of the soul has arisen from time to time. Another view in regard to this is: "As² life is given to the child in his mother's womb, so the angel pours the soul into him." — Friar Berthold. Sermon.

Luther expressed himself in favor of creationism. Later teachings of the Lutheran doctrine of the seventeenth century

¹ Ueberweg: Hist. of Phil., Vol. I, p. 464.

² Hagenbach: History of Doctrine, Vol. II, p. 241.

opposed the view. Modern teachers of the Protestant doctrine, *e. g.*, Göschel, recognized spirit and psyche, the latter being propagated by procreation, the former, by creation. Schöberlein regarded the soul as a natural product, but thought that the created spirit is absorbed into the soul of man, the two forming a union. Thus the soul becomes possessor of the spirit.

In regard to animal spirits and their relation to the soul: "These spirits are either the soul or an immediate instrument of the soul: this is certainly true; and their brightness surpasses the brightness of the sun and of all the stars. What is most wonderful is that in godly men the divine Spirit itself mingles with these same spirits, and with His divine light makes them still more bright, so that their knowledge of God may be yet more luminous, their attachment to Him more solid, and their aspirations toward Him more ardent. But if devils dwell in the heart, they blow upon the spirits, and bringing the heart and brain into confusion, interfere with judgment, give rise to open madness, and induce the heart and other members to commit the most cruel acts." — Melancthon.¹

Relative of the soul to God and its nature: ". . . we are fashioned in the image of God in our minds or souls. . . . But what this image is we know not, excepting that the soul is the substance, upon which the image of God is specially impressed. And as we have never seen God in Himself, in His own form, we cannot know how our souls are like Him in substance and nature. And it comes at last to this, that the workings or powers of the soul, viz., will, understanding and memory, are nothing but signs of the essential image, which we shall really see when we see God as He is in Himself, and ourselves in Him." — Zwingli² *Von der Klarheit des Wortes Gottes*, I, 56.

St. Teresa uses language signifying some kind of animate substance and as though it were apart from the body: "The disquiet of the soul comes most frequently from bodily indisposition—for we are so wretched that this poor prisoner of a soul shares in the miseries of the body. The changes of the seasons and the alterations of the humors very often compel it, without any fault of its own, not to be what it would, but rather to suffer in every way,—some discretion must be used in order to understand whether ill-health be the occasion or not. The poor soul must not be stifled." — St. Teresa, *Life*, XI.

The spirit nature of man: man's spirit is his mind, which lives after death in complete human form. "Men are con-

¹ Lange: *History of Materialism*, Vol. I, p. 238.

² Hagenbach: *History of Doctrine*, Vol. III, p. 73.

stantly surrounded by spirits and angels of God who understand everything spiritually, because they are spiritual. After death, too, men are instructed by angels." — Swedenborg, Divine Revelation, I, p. 87.

The relation of body, soul and spirit: "The ¹soul is consequently, the sensitive organ, not the body, and is therefore the true and real body of the spirit, and the body is only its outward framework, its shell and covering." — Zschoke.

Soul and body: "Nature ² is a living organism; there is an ideal in the real, a subject within the object, reason in matter. There is a soul in the world. All is pervaded by a law of polar forces." — Schelling.

Relation of God and man: The instances given below are taken from a number of more recent ideas, collected from the writings of different authors.

"The spirit is the spiritual nature of man as directed upward, and as capable of living intercourse with God. The soul is the spiritual nature as the quickening power of the body, as in animals; hence excitable through the senses, with faculties of perception and feeling." — Auberlen. Thompson's Dictionary of Phil., p. 36.

"The soul is the inferior part of our intellectual nature. The spirit is that part of our nature which tends to the purely rational, the lofty and divine." — Fleming. Vocab. of Philos., p. 474.

"Man was created psychical, but with the destination and means to become spiritual. The important point of his beginning lay in the soul, which unites his spirit-life and his corporeal life, by means of which, spirit and body stood in a reciprocal relation, whose aim was the glorification of the body." The life of the spirit was to make the soul — and by some means, the body the reflection of itself. "The soul, as little is the *doxa* of God, has an existence severed from its origin, and stiffened into passive, deliberate neutrality; the egress of the soul from the spirit is a continual process engaged in constant accomplishment, whose progress is only distinguished from the creative commencement by the fact that, after man is once created, both, without any temporal before and after, have an existence absolutely contemporary, and placed under a similar law of development." — Delitzsch: A System of Biblical Psychology.

"Our soul, ³ properly speaking, is not ours but we are its. It is not a part of us but we are a part of it. It is larger than

¹ Hemstreet: Mind is Matter (quoted), p. 37.

² *Ibid.*, p. 52.

³ Ways of the Spirit, pp. 358-62.

we are, and older than we are, — that is than our conscious self. . . . It is not aboriginal, but a product, as it were the blossoming of an individuality. We may suppose countless souls which never bear this product, which never blossom into self. And the soul which does so blossom exists before the blossom unfolds." Whether a new soul is furnished to each new body, or whether the body is given to a pre-existing soul — psychology seems to favor the latter. "What we call 'I' is not the origin, but a product of the soul, a phase or mode of its present life. The soul was prior to its conscious self; it is the root or seed from which the conscious self has grown." — Hedge. The spirit¹ is the higher side of our incorporeal nature — the mind, as it is termed in scripture, when contemplated under its intellectual aspects, — the inner man, as it is also denoted, when viewed in its purely theological relations, in a word, the moving, ruling and animating principle of our natures. It is also the medium of our communication with, and the very temple of, the Holy Ghost. Thus the spirit may be regarded more as the realm of intellectual forces. . . . The soul is the lower side of our incorporeal nature, and the subject of the spirit's sway. It may be regarded more as the region of the feelings, affections, and impulses, of all that peculiarly individualizes and personifies. But it should be observed that scripture often represents the soul to us as almost necessarily involving and including the spirit. Thus the scripture never speaks of the salvation of the spirit, but the salvation of the soul." — Ellicott.

"It is² this trial of the soul which shows that one is never alone in the universe. It is the supreme evidence that there is a God, the one unquestionable assurance that God means something in all that we endure and suffer."

"If we are all ultimate manifestations of one Infinite Life, then in deepest truth, there is but one soul. . . . It is the consecrated person who has the greatest evidence that there is a soul . . . because he can thus transcend the limitations alike of feeling and thought, of time and space, is the ultimate reason for saying that man has, yes, that man is, a soul." — Dresser.

"I see³ no scientific reason for doubting that disembodied spirits affect man both for good and for evil as men affect one another." — Dr. Lyman Abbott.

⁴"The individual existence of man begins on the sense plane of the physical world, but rises through successive gradations

¹ *Destiny of the Creature*, pp. 120-24.

² *In Search of a Soul*, pp. 76-87.

³ Quoted by Hemstreet: *The Substance of the Soul*, pp. 180-84.

⁴ *In Tune with the Infinite*, p. 29.

of ethereal and celestial spheres, corresponding with his ever-unfolding deific life and powers, to a destiny of unspeakable grandeur and glory. Within and above every physical planet is a corresponding ethereal organism, or soul-body, of which the physical is but the external counterpart and materialized expression. From this etherealized or soul-planet, which is the immediate home of our arisen humanity, there rises or deepens in infinite gradations, spheres within and above spheres, to celestial heights of spiritualized existence utterly inconceivable to the sense of man. Embodiment, accordingly, is two-fold, — the physical being but the temporary husk, so to speak, in and by which the real and permanent ethereal organism is individualized and perfected, somewhat as the full corn in the ear is reached by means of its husk, for which there is no further use. By means of the indestructible ethereal body and the corresponding ethereal spheres of environment with the social life and relations in the spheres, the individual and personal life is preserved forever." —Trine.

The ideas of soul, expressed in the teachings of Christian Science,¹ are to the effect that Mind, Soul, Spirit and God are alike in substance. "Soul or Mind is not seen by a corporeal sense, because it is spirit, which physical sight cannot discern. There is neither growth, maturity, nor decay in Soul. These errors are the mutations of sense, the varying clouds of mortal belief, which hide the Truth of Being."

"Science reveals Soul as God, untouched by sin and death, as the central Life and Intelligence, around which circle harmoniously all things in the systems of Mind."

"Spirit is the only Substance, the invisible and indivisible God. . . . There is but one Spirit, because there can be but one Infinite, and therefore but one God."

"Soul and Spirit are one. God is Soul. Therefore there can be but one Soul. Soul is not corporeal; neither does it belong to a limited mind or a limited body."

"The term souls, or spirits, is as improper as the term gods. Soul, or Spirit, signifies Deity, and nothing else."

"The immortality of Soul makes man immortal. If God, who is the Soul of man, were parted from His reflection, man, during that moment, etc. . . . Science reveals Spirit, Soul, as not in the body, and God as not in man, but as reflected by man."

"Human thought has adulterated the meaning of the word soul. . . . The proper use of the word soul can always be gained by substituting the word *God*, where the deific meaning is required. In other cases, use the word *sense* and you have

¹ Science and Health, pp. 206-235.

the Scientific signification. As used in Christian Science, Soul is properly the synonym of God, or Spirit; but out of Science soul is identical with sense."—Eddy.

"I gather this—that the spiritual body is real, is tangible, is visible, is human, —but that we shall be changed." — Eliz. Stuart Phelps: Gates Ajar.

"The spirit of the departed dead, I am convinced, have a certain influence over our minds." — Bishop Bowman.

"Radiant forces pass from us continually, as truly as light proceeds from the stars. A speaker reaches his audience by invisible ways that penetrate to the interior sense." — Denton.

"The mind is a spiritual substance, and there goes from it a sphere that surrounds it, and it is a radiant force like light or heat." — Evans.

The ideas presented in the latter part of this section are self-explanatory.

The opinions, either directly or indirectly expressed, of thirty-eight persons have been briefly presented. These give us, to some extent, a chronological view of various notions of the soul that have been held at different times by persons identified with the church, or those presenting the subject from a theological standpoint. The rules and laws of the church, as guides to certain beliefs or as forces compelling certain beliefs, must not be overlooked. In this respect we have a standard set up, — in one sense a school for education along certain lines, for those who are to become its members. The standards have changed from time to time, and have been revised by various church councils. Certain doctrines have been condemned at times; for instance, the Platonic idea of pre-existence was carried along through Neo-platonism, and came in contact with the doctrines of the church. Origen, among others, had taught it, but at the second council at Constantinople (553) Origen's teachings were condemned because they were thought to be too free and unsystematized, and with them the doctrine of pre-existence. This blow of the church was also aimed at Neo-platonism. The much disputed point of trans-substantiation, which was satisfactorily settled at the Synod of Vienna, has been a potent factor in volatilizing thought, *i. e.*, the bread and wine symbolized Christ's body; finally they came to represent life in Him.

Another factor¹ that has been potent in forming the idea of the soul is that of angels. Ideas suggested by their pictures and descriptions have had great influence in shaping ideas in regard to the soul. Justin Martyr regarded angels as personal beings who possess a permanent existence. He thought their

¹ Hagenback: Hist. of Doct., Vol. I, pp. 193-98.

bodies are analogous to those of men, and their food manna.

Tatian thought their bodies ethereal and claimed that they could be perceived only by those in whom the spirit of God dwells and not by the natural or psychical man. Clement, in describing them, observed that they have neither ears, nor tongues, nor lips, nor entrails, nor organs of respiration, etc. Origen assigned to each a sphere of work.

In the Middle Ages¹ the science of spirits (souls) was called Pneumatology. It comprised the study of God, angels and man, the psychology of angels holding a place side by side with that of man.

During the later scholastic period² angels are distinguished from the souls of men as follows: (1) Physically, they have no actual need of a body. (2) Logically, they do not obtain knowledge by inferences. (3) Metaphysically, they do not think by means of images, but by immediate intuition. (4) Theologically, they do not become better or worse.

The nature of angels afforded much ground for debate. The ideas still prevalent are potent factors in moulding the lives of young people.

Much of the discussion concerning the soul during the past, as gathered from this study, has been without fact as a basis. A larger entity, nous, world-soul, spiritual existence, etc., is believed in; this, it is supposed by many, resides apart, has a personal relation to man, has furnished him a soul, presides over him in a personal manner. At death, if the soul is still in harmony with its creator, without sin, it returns thither. Early Christians thought that with the advent of Christ something had been done for them, that some objective help had been extended to them. This view still holds with some. The doctrine of immanence as a result of pantheism has tended to modify this view. In this Spinoza has been influential. Later thought, in many instances, recognizes the existence of a universal pervading spirit; soul is related to this from above; from below it has its corporeal relations with its fellow creatures. Most of the views presented belong to those who have been leaders at some time and do not represent the laity. Modern thought tends toward an ethical interpretation of the soul, this, perhaps, being the nearest approach to immaterial objectification that can be made.

THE SOUL WITH REFERENCE TO SYSTEMS OF PHILOSOPHY.

Strictly speaking there may be no purely philosophical conception of the soul apart from theology, or from psychological

¹Janet & Seailles: History of the Problems of Philosophy, Vol. I, p. 27.

²Hagenback: History of Doctrine, Vol. II, p. 235.

analysis. This separation is merely arbitrary. Yet there is almost as much basis for it as there is for a line of distinction marking off theology, philosophy and psychology as independent departments of knowledge, none of which are sharply defined. The justification for such a study is as follows: first we have the idea of the soul as it is related to a personal God, this being the view held by the church. Besides this we have various discussions of an entified soul in different relations to an absolute being, — this may be a pantheistic view, or represent the soul's relation to a world soul, or a spiritual world, or some form of the Absolute. Then we have the idea of the soul as derived from a study of mental phenomena, — rather from empirical data; this falling under the head of psychology. The philosophy of the Christian Era was under the domination of the church. "Unity, servitude, freedom, — these are the three stages through which it has passed in its relation to ecclesiastical theology," says Ueberweg.¹ "The first movement in this direction consisted in a mere exchange of authorities, or in the reproduction of other ancient systems than that of Aristotle, without such modification and such adaptation to new and changed conditions, as the scholastics had effected in the system of Aristotle. Then followed the era of independent investigation in the realm of nature, and finally, also, in the realm of mind. . . . The second epoch of Empiricism and dogmatism was characterized by methodical investigations and comprehensive systems, which are based on the confident belief that the knowledge of natural and spiritual reality was independently attainable by means of experience or thought alone. Skepticism prepared the way for the third stadium in the history of modern philosophy, which was founded by criticism." Independent thought, free from the influence of the church and schools of scholasticism, — "two prisons of ² knowledge," began to find expression during the fourteenth century. From this period to the close of the sixteenth the awakening took place, followed by the Reformation. The various causes that gave rise to those changes cannot be noted here, they were fundamental, the growth was natural. The church gradually lost its influence along several lines: it could no longer say what a man should think, nor was it able to suppress the expression of thought; it had no control over the discoveries and inventions of the times, it could not keep pace with them nor incorporate them into its system. With such an outline as is here presented our philosophical consideration of the soul will begin with the period of freedom of thought. Since during

¹ A History of Philos., Vol. II, p. 2.

² Fischer: A History of Mod. Phil., p. 80.

this period we have also the beginnings in a generalized way of modern psychology, though it is subordinate to philosophy, the problem becomes more complicated. The central point in the¹ study of both was the nature of the soul.

Free philosophical expression began with no one man in particular, but is the result of the utterances of many teachers and writers. These philosophical expressions mark the beginning of modern philosophy. Different writers have ascribed to different men the beginning of this epoch. Lewes begins with Bacon and Descartes, Falckenberg with Descartes, etc. Bacon was a philosopher and scientist combined. He excluded theology from his scheme; — he says, "If I² proceed to treat of it, I shall step out of the bark of human reason, and enter into the ship of the church; which is only able by the Divine Compass to rightly direct its course."

The sensible soul of man is material like that of animals. It consists of a fine fiery air which streams from the brain through the nerves and is nourished by the blood. Sensibility of impressions is characteristic of everything. The sensible soul is material, the spiritual soul is implanted by God; only religion can give instruction pertaining to the soul.

As is God so also is the spirit, which God has breathed into man, scientifically incognizable; only the physical soul, which is a thin, warm, material substance, is an object of scientific knowledge.

Bruno was the first metaphysician of the sixteenth century to accept the heliocentric system. For him³ the elementary parts of all that exist are the minima or monads, which are spherical points both psychical and material. The soul is a monad. It is never entirely without a body. God is the supreme monad. He is the minimum, because all things are external to him, and the maximum since all things are in Him. He is present in things in like manner as being is present, or beauty in beautiful objects. God is the original and immanent cause of the universe. The stars are moved by the souls immanent in them. Matter and form are identical; matter contains in herself the forms of things. The beginnings of science greatly influenced the philosophical systems during this early period.

The awakening to a knowledge of natural forces and their application led to extreme materialistic views. Cause and effect was sought for, mechanics used; as a result we have Hobbes's application of the laws of mechanics to mental phenomena, and the mechanical theory of Descartes.

For Campanella the inner sense is a proof that sensation is

¹ Bowne: *Metaphysics*, p. 299-300.

² Lewes: *Hist. of Phil.*, Vol. II, p. 116.

³ Ueberweg: *Hist. of Phil.*, Vol. II, p. 27.

true, *i. e.*, that the object really exists outside of the individual. Sense-perception derives its character of certitude from reason and reason transforms it into knowledge. The inner sense reveals to me my existence immediately as a being that exists, acts, knows, and wills. To exist means to proceed from a principle and to return to it. Power, wisdom and love are the 'primalities' of relative being, the sum of these is God. By mingling non-being in increasing measure with His pure being, the Deity produced in succession the ideas, angels, the immortal souls of men, space and the world of perishable things. All these existences have souls; nothing exists without sensation. When plants wilt they grieve, after a refreshing rain they experience pleasure. Sympathy and antipathy account for the free movements of all natural objects. "The soul is corporeal;¹ it is the warm, mobile, nervous spirit. Things work upon this spirit, thereby assimilating it to themselves." The change that this produces remains in the spirit like a scar. It strives after its principle, not like most things after finite principles, but infinite. It attains immortality by virtue of its striving. As a philosopher Descartes with his "thought" as the essence of the mind or soul, later followed by Spinoza with the belief that the soul is the "idea" of the body, these in their wider sense no doubt are philosophical doctrines; but as analytical studies of soul they are considered under the section on psychology.

Gassendi revived the atomistic conception of the universe. The universe is a co-ordinate whole, the elements of which are atoms. These are determinations of an indestructible principle, which is matter. The appearance and disappearance of things is only the reunion and separation of atoms. He thought that atoms² possess feeling, they are created by God. An all-pervading world-soul is thus assumed. He attempted to unite spiritualistic ideas with atomistic and mechanic doctrines. The soul moves the body in so far only as it is itself material. There is a natural soul, vegetative-sensitiven (*Lebens princip*) and a rational, immaterial, immortal soul. These are connected. There are no innate ideas; all knowledge begins with the senses, they yield us immediate cognition of things; phantasy reproduces our ideas and understanding compares them. "Phantasia" is the counterpart of sense, it has to do with material images, it is material, and the same in both men and brutes. The intellect is immaterial and immortal; it attains notions and truths of which no effort of sensation or imagina-

¹ Pünger: A Hist. of the Christ. Phil. of Relig., p. 102.

² Carus: Lehrbuch der Psychologie, p. 193.

tion can give us the slightest apprehension: as the notion of God, for example. The final end of life is happiness, harmony of soul and body.

Leibnitz is one of the foremost among the philosophers belonging to this early period. Descartes recognized no extension in the soul, this was directly contradicted by Leibnitz's theory of monads. Our inner experience¹ reveals to us an active real force, which is the only force we know; this is our soul. Metaphysical atoms must be conceived of after the image of our soul. Everything in the world is force, soul, life, thought, desire; we see only the outside of Being, Being is that which itself sees. Perception explains the unity, likewise the diversity of the monads. The monad is a created thing and subject to change, its nature is perception. The effort made by a monad to pass from one internal state to another is appetite. The primitive monad is God; those which are thinking beings, like human souls, are capable of clear and distinct ideas; they are also conscious of themselves and of God. The souls of animals have sensation and memory.

"The merely living thing is the monad joined to an appropriate body. Its perception is unconscious and both perish together. *Omne corpus mens est momentanea*. The second degree is that of the monad endowed with more distinct perception, *i. e.*, with feeling; such a monad may be called a soul; when united to its proper body it is an animal. The third degree is that of the soul endowed with reason and reflection, or minds (spirits). The spirits are characterized by knowledge, properly so-called, by self-knowledge, by the possession of universal truths, and consequently the possibility of demonstrative knowledge." All the monads of the human body are independent, yet they harmonize with the monad soul. That which appears to us as a body is in reality an aggregation of many monads. Everything in nature is organized. There are no bodies without souls, also no souls without bodies. Plants and minerals are, as it were, sleeping monads with unconscious ideas. Every organism is a complex of them. In plants ideas are formative vital forces. The greater distinctness of its ideas distinguish the dominant monad, it is more active and more perfect, it reflects clearly while the body monads reflect but obscurely. The monads of the body are the first and direct object of the soul. The soul and the body of man agree, like two clocks originally set together and moving at exactly the same rate. When soul and body were first created, independent harmonious law was established. The soul following the law of association of ideas may have a painful sensation at the

¹Leibnitz, by Theodore Merz, p. 177 *seq.*

same time that the body receives a wound. A desire arises in the soul and by the law of mechanics at the same instant the arm is extended.

"The more we think of it," says Bowen, "the more that doctrine of Leibnitz,¹ which appears so wild and fanciful at first, that every monad has in it from its first creation an infinite number of confused unconscious perceptions; and that these, in the successive stages of its being, are slowly evolved from each other in regular order, and so rise into consciousness, not through any contact or impulse from things without, though such contact or impulse furnishes the *occasion* on which they rise, but only through the monad's or soul's own internal law of development—the more, I say, this doctrine appears plausible and credible."

Voltaire presents quite a different view. The optimism of Leibnitz finds no place for him.² From the facts of astronomy he came to the conclusion that the teachings of the church were untrue. He may be taken as a representative of the scepticism of the French enlightenment; he emphasizes more strongly than Locke the possibility of the supposition that matter may think; and will not believe that there dwells within the brain an unextended substance, like a little God. He is inclined to regard the substantial soul as an "*abstraction réalisée*," like the ancient goddess Memoria, or such as a personification of the blood-forming force would be. All our ideas arise from the senses. "No one," says Voltaire, "will ever make me believe that I am always thinking, and I am no more disposed than Locke to imagine that several weeks after my conception I was a very learned soul, knowing then a thousand things which I forgot at my birth." He admits that certain ideas—moral, especially, although not necessarily innate, arise perforce from the constitution of human nature. He believes that the existence of God is demonstrable. The Deity and immortality are postulates of the moral feeling.

Voltaire, for example, expresses nothing positive. He is rather a representative of a reactionary movement of thought against church doctrine. The doctrine of innate ideas has been a burning question at times. The Innate Idea seems to carry with it something of the pre-existent, in fact it has been held in the past as a necessary support to religious teachings. Beginning with Plato, the theory did not meet with great opposition until the time of Locke.

The three ideas of innateness³ are, (1) the idea is given us at our first creation, bearing no relation to the other faculties;

¹Modern Philosophy, p. 45.

²Ueberweg: Hist. of Phil., Vol. II, p. 124.

³Fleming: Vocab. of Phil., p. 26.

(2) it is given us as a form, either of thought generally or of some particular species of thought, and is embodied in our mental powers; (3) the idea is interwoven in the original constitution of some mental power. The first view is that regarded by the church. Whether man came into existence with a trace from the past, or with a soul partly preformed, was a vital question, and since the time of Locke we find first one view predominant and then the other advocated, according as some one school or another came into prominence. In recent times the question is wrapped up in that of heredity.

Berkeley recognized only spirits and their functions; the existence of the material world is not only undemonstrable, but false. Abstract matter is a phrase without meaning; individual things are collections of ideas in us; if we take away all sense-qualities from a thing nothing remains. Ideas are the only objects of knowledge, nothing exists except minds and their ideas. His theory of mind is that ideas are of three sources.¹

1. "Ideas actually imprinted on the senses.

2. "Ideas arrived at by attending to the passions and operations of the mind, as pleasure, pain, etc.

3. "Ideas formed by memory or imagination reviving and combining the two other classes." Besides these three kinds of ideas there is something that knows or perceives them and exercises the functions of willing, imagining, remembering: "This is mind, spirit, soul, myself, but it is something different from the ideas that constitute knowledge. All things that compose the frame of the world — subsist either in the mind of created spirits or in the mind of some eternal spirit. There is no other substance but spirit.

"Sense² and experience acquaint us with the course and analogy of appearances or natural effects. Thought, reason, intellect, introduce us into the knowledge of their causes." Sense implies an impression from some other being, and denotes a dependence in the soul which hath it. Sense is a passion; and passions imply imperfection. God knoweth all things as pure mind or intellect; but nothing of sense, nor in, nor through a sensory. As men rise from the life of sense toward the reason that is found to shine in and through sense, they approach that union with God — the chief end of man. Each lower faculty in us is a step that leads to one above it, — the uppermost brings us to God, who is Reason. Ideas are not innate but the rational constitution of things is innate in that intellect which we share with God. The existence of matter is

¹ Bain: *Mental Science*, p. 203.

² Fraser's Berkeley, pp. 203-206.

not directly known, the existence of spirit is known directly. This is the only existence. The natural or created ideas which God impresses on us are copies of the eternal ideas which he himself perceives through his creative reason. Thus, following Berkeley's views, we do not arrive at any definition of soul, but mind or spirit is the only real existence, God exists as a spirit, and man's nature partakes of this spirit life.

Reid, the founder of the Scottish school, propounded a system of philosophy in which appeal was made to common sense — this in order to avoid the scepticism of Hume.

"I take¹ it for granted that all the thoughts that I am conscious of or remember, are the thoughts of one and the same thinking principle, which I call *myself* or *my mind*." "Every action or operation therefore supposes an agent; every quality supposes a subject. . . . We do not give the name of mind to thought, reason, or desire, but to that being which thinks, which reasons, which desires." "My personal identity implies the continued existence of that indivisible thing which I call myself. To what purpose is it for philosophy to decide against common sense. The belief in a material world is older and of more authority than the principles of authority." To judge of first principles requires no more than a sound mind free from prejudice, and a distinct conception of the question. Those things really persist that we distinctly perceive by our senses, and are what we perceive them to be. The qualities that are perceived by the senses must have a subject (*i. e.*, the body), the thoughts we are conscious of must have a subject (*i. e.*, the mind). The distinction between sensible qualities and the substance to which they belong is found in the structure of all languages. Nothing is more absurd than that there should be extension without anything extended, motion without anything moved. Every sensation is the sign of the presence of an object. The reality of the subject is guaranteed by thinking. What the understanding recognizes clearly and distinctly is necessarily so. We perceive because God has given us the power of perceiving. The sphere of consciousness cannot be transcended. Reid's view, as the common sense one, identifies the mind or soul with that which thinks, reasons and desires; one's personal identity implies the continued existence of an indivisible self.

Lessing is regarded by some as a follower of Leibnitz. For Lessing the Deity is the "supreme, all-comprehensive living unity, without life and action and the experience of changing states. Things are not out of God but in him, yet distinct. God's thinking is creation, his ideas actuality. Every individ-

¹On the Intellectual Powers of Man, Vol. I, chap. xi.

ual is an isolated divine perfection. Things in the world are all living, all have souls and of a spiritual nature, though in different degrees, in fact they are limited gods. Development is everywhere. The soul now has five senses but probably it once had less than five and in the future will have more. God creates only simple beings, there exists a harmony among these that explains all the world processes. With different degrees of perfection these beings possess different degrees of the consciousness of this perfection and act accordingly. All created things are simple percipient beings. God is the highest and most perfect monad. Harmony binds the world and all that is in it together. Soul¹ is a simple being which is capable of infinite perceptions; as a finite being it is not capable of this at once but gradually in an infinite succession of time. Thus it becomes developed, but it implies a future life. We may receive more senses in that life, a new organization, as we develop, that we may receive more ideas. The material world is animated, particles serving the soul in any one sense constitute homogeneous combinations of matter; there may be as many senses as there are such possible combinations; there are more than five of these. The individual soul has already been several times in different bodies and shall continue to develop through similar transmigrations in the future.

According to histories of philosophy this might be the place in a series of briefs like these to mention Kant, and in fact classic philosophy would almost consider it a sacrilege to omit some treatment of his ideas. Perhaps this is the place, yet this study pretends to be historical only in the sense of getting a general picture, and mention is made elsewhere of his ideas. He examined critically the rational and empirical views that have been held by the different schools, pointed out inconsistencies, and, as far as possible, attempted to harmonize them. In place of the antitheses which Kant had set up between the categories as rules of the understanding and principles of the reason, Fichte regarded these as strata; that is, the reason apprehends in a purer form what it has accomplished in a lower stage. Fichte thus develops one part of the Kantian system more completely, — instead of the transcendental being closed we develop into it. Philosophy is "the systematic development of the idea of the Ego."² The non-Ego is a postulate of our reason, — this is, at the time, unconsciously made, it is a product of the Ego. The Ego alone remains when the unknown (substance) is abolished. The Ego creates this. Starting from the existence of mind or ego, Fichte developed his

¹ Pünjer: *Hist of the Christ. Phil. of Relig.*, p. 568.

² Adamson's *Fichte*, pp. 163-188.

system. The absolute Ego is known by an intellectual intuition. The first and lowest stage of the Ego is one of passivity, it is not reflectively aware of the activity involved in itself, but rather a state of sensation. The second stage is reached when it is aware of the activity in itself, of sensation; when it reflects on these, and opposes to itself something foreign, this is the stage of intuition. By reflection on intuition an image of that which is considered constructed, this image is distinguished from a real thing to which the image corresponds, forms the third stage. A fourth is understanding through which the concept is gained; the fifth and highest stage of the consciousness is reflection upon judgment, in this abstraction is made of all save the Ego itself, which is pure abstraction.

The only reality is the spiritual, matter as non-Ego is postulated, the mind makes all that it knows. The absolute Ego, the universal soul, whose essence is activity, sets opposite to itself an illusory world. Fichte's notions of philosophy were modified in later years, the idea of a personal God was criticised. In his later works God is the moral order of the world. The life of consciousness, the manifestation of God, breaks itself up into an endless multiplicity of individual forms; these, as independent, self-existing facts, are the mode of one infinite life.

"The substance¹ is the totality of its accidents, nothing more is embraced in it than the accidents; analyze the substance, and nothing is reached but accidents. An enduring substance, or, if you please, a bearer of accidents, is not to be thought of; one accident supports another. . . . The soul is no more than nature; it is a phenomenon of the internal sense. But we must frame a better notion of nature than that it is a dead material thing; we must think of it as spiritual. Nature is a formal image of the absolute, and its supreme point is man." Soul becomes the active principle, creating nature.

Fichte's system of idealism is followed by Schelling, and this again by Hegel. For Fichte² it is the "I" that exists, for Schelling the "I" and the object are both real, for Hegel the only thing really existing is the idea. In order to explain the development of nature from the lowest to the highest formations, Schelling assumes the existence of a soul of the world as an organizing principle. The perfect theory of nature would resolve all nature into intelligence. Dead and unconscious products of nature are abortive attempts to reflect itself, it is immature intelligences which shines through all her phenomena. All individual intelligence may be regarded as integral parts of God, or of the moral order of the world. Matter is extinct

¹J. G. Fichte: Werke, Vol. II, p. 562 *seq.*

²Lewes: Hist. of Phil., Vol. II, p. 595.

mind. The eternal Son of God is the finite as it exists in the eternal intuition of God. This Finite appears as a suffering God,—subject to the fatalities of time. History mirrors the world-spirit as an eternal poem of the divine understanding. Nature is the embryonic life of spirit, they are essentially identical. The real and the ideal, the objective and the subjective are, so to speak, two poles of the Absolute. This world-soul embracing subject and object is apprehended by us in our deepest intellectual intuitions. The plurality of souls is the development of the Absolute.

“My Ego¹ is only so far, and can be thought of only so far as it thinks itself.” It brings itself forth by its thinking,—by absolute causality.

“The Ego or human spirit abstracted from its powers and acts is nothing. The soul is not something existing in itself, and which could consequently exist, if it neither felt, nor thought, nor willed.”

“The soul, as it exists by relative antithesis to the body, consequently not in itself, appears only by this antithesis as determined to existence. It is on the one side, one with the body, and on the other, it is the infinite cognizing. To the soul so far as it is finite, we must ascribe all the relations which are of necessity ascribed to the body. In its infinite cognizing, the infinite thinking has become objective; on this being, at once subjective and objective, infinite and finite, rests the Ego. It is the unity of the subjective and objective.” There is no such thing as body opposed to soul. We give the name of spirit to the power which, in its being exterior to itself, still abides with itself.

Hegel represents another type of idealism. The attempts of idealists to define God and the soul and to establish a relationship between them have been the chief factors reducing these elements to unknowable or unthinkable terms. For Hegel² all things come from the Absolute, which is the idea. Spirit is developed, by the logical process, from dependence on nature to freedom, this is its essence. The steps of progress are the subjective spirit depending on nature and on the body, this is manifest in the study of anthropology; the objective spirit seen in the products of the will: customs, laws, etc.; and the absolute spirit which appears in art, religion, and philosophy. Reality is the common source of the Ego and nature, they are immanent in it. Mind and nature are the successive modes of God, and the union of nature and idea is in spirit, is in God. The soul is not present at any one point, but everywhere at

¹ Fleming: *Vocab. of Phil.*, Fichte, *Werke* Vol. I, p. 96; II, 193-95.

² Ueberweg: *Hist. of Phil.*, Vol. II, p. 233.

millions of points. "The principle¹ stages of subjective spirit are natural spirit, or soul, consciousness, and spirit as such." The momenta of the Idea are life, cognition, and the absolute Idea; the Absolute Idea is the pure form of the conception. Nature is the idea in the form of otherness. "The death of mere immediate, particular life is the birth of the spirit." Psychology considers spirit as intelligence, will, and ethicality.

The divine and the human are one, man's spirit is identical with the infinite intelligence. "We must say of everything which exists, that it exists and is maintained by an eternal act of knowledge on the part of the Absolute; and the spirit of man, being itself the Absolute, has the faculty of reproducing freely, through speculative thought, this eternal act of knowledge."

"The pure² reference to myself—the reflection in which I no longer refer myself to some other, but refer myself to myself, or an object to myself—this is the Ego, the web of the infinite being itself. It is the complete abstraction from all that is finite. The Ego as such has no contents given by nature or immediate, but has only itself as contents, as it is only by means of abstraction from every other. This pure form is at the same time its contents." The body is the same life as the soul, and yet they may be spoken of as lying asunder. A soul without body would be nothing living, and the converse is true. The existence of the notion is its body; the body obeys the soul which has brought it forth. The germs have the true in them, and embrace its total force, though they are not yet the true itself." "The soul generates the unity of the body and is its permeating vital force." This indicates very briefly the pantheistic view of Hegel. Yet for as complete system as he has given it can be but a very brief account.

Briefly passing over some of the more recent ideas we note the following: For Hamilton, "Subject denotes the mind itself, mind and matter as known and knowable are only two different series of phenomena or qualities; as unknown and unknowable they are the two substances in which these two different series of phenomena or qualities are supposed to inhere. The existence of an unknown substance is an inference we are compelled to make from the existence of known phenomena. God is an object of faith, not knowledge, "a God understood would be no God at all." Through experience and reason we are naturally inspired with a kind of suggestion and belief in being, transcending what we actually experience. Experience, especially of mind, is the ground for deciding alternatives in

¹ Caird's Hegel, p. 183.

² Werke XVIII, 21 and 93; VIII, 22, 23. Fleming's Vocab.

theology. On the ground of experience and what we find in consciousness only can we have any convictions regarding the nature of mind, the world, and of God. The substance of the mind and the world are incognizable *per se*, but relatively knowable through special qualities and manifestations. Mind is known primarily as Ego or self in its unity amid successive stages. By analogy from our experience we reach a noumenal entity called God, related on the side of time and space to the things therein, on the side of mind to the Ego and the contents of consciousness. These relations give us an imperfect knowledge of God. There is no need for a doctrine of omnipresent creation, the grand order of the cosmos may have been constituted in one great act. "Consciousness¹ is simple—is not composed of parts, either similar or dissimilar. It always resembles itself, differing only in the degree of its intensity: thus there are not various kinds of consciousness, although there are various kinds of mental modes or states of which we are conscious."

For Schopenhauer.² The unconscious will which constitutes the reality of things existent, is first and original. The intellect is physically conditioned, depending on the functioning of a material organ. It is dependent upon this organ and without it is just as impossible as the grasp without the hand; it belongs to the phenomenon. Will is bound to no special organ, is everywhere present, that which moves and forms, and conditions the whole organism,—the metaphysical substratum of all phenomena. Death teaches man that his true nature which is will, will henceforth live in other individuals, while his intellect continues to exist in the condition of being idea, *i. e.*, in the objective being of things.

"It is purely impossible for us to be conscious of ourselves, independently of the objects of knowing and willing. When we enter into ourselves, and begin to reflect on ourselves, we lose ourselves in a fathomless emptiness, in a darkness in which all cognition ceases, and we grasp nothing but an insubstantial spectre, the Ego itself remains after it all a riddle."

For Fechner: The soul of man partakes of the larger consciousness animating the world. The earth-soul looks through the eyes of all men. As our body is occupied throughout by our soul, so the world-soul or God occupies the universe.

"The phenomena³ of body and soul hang together as internal and external phenomena of the same essence. This primary essence is, however, nothing more than the conjunction of phe-

¹ Hamilton's *Metaphysics*, LXI.

² *The World as Will and Idea*, Vol. III, pp. 3 and 306; I, 327.

³ *Physical and Philosophical "Atomlehre,"* pp. 258-59.

nomena themselves in the unity of a general consciousness. The soul becomes aware only of its own proper phenomena, the body becomes aware only through that which appears of it to the soul itself. It is a common essence which appears externally as body, internally as soul."

"The entire¹ spiritual life is rooted in this corporeal soil, and uses the bodily organism as its instrument. The spirit has no independent agency; it acts only through and in the body. It can manifest itself only by means of its necessary instrument, the body. Hence every disturbance of the body will produce, by reaction, a corresponding disturbance in the mode in which the mind is accustomed to manifest itself." — Luthardt.

For Spencer:² "Mind as known to the possessor of it, is a circumscribed aggregate of activities; and the cohesion of these activities, one with another, throughout the aggregate, compels the postulation of a something of which they are the activities. But the same experiences which make him aware of this coherent aggregate of mental activities, simultaneously make him aware of activities that are not included in it. . . . These external activities must forever remain to him nothing more than the unknown correlatives of their effects on the aggregate." Mind and matter are alike unknown.

"Once more we are brought round to the conclusion repeatedly reached by other routes, that behind all manifestations, inner and outer, there is a Power manifested. Here, as before, it has become clear that while the nature of this Power cannot be known — while we lack the faculty of framing even the dimmest conception of it, yet its universal presence is the absolute without which there can be no relative facts. Every feeling and thought being but transitory — an entire life made up of such feelings and thoughts being also but transitory — nay, the objects amid which life is passed, though less transitory, being severally in course of losing their individualities, quickly or slowly: we may learn that the one thing permanent is the Unknowable Reality hidden under all these changing shapes." ³

"In the organism formed of atoms, which are spiritual essences, one unfolds its spiritual force to the point of self-consciousness; this atom, which as gasiform atom interpenetrates the entire organism, and occupies space as a centre, is the soul. It is invisible, but a local and not unphysical essence. The mass of the brain is an organized state of living essences, which are directed by one of their own number in the midst as a choir of music by their leader." — Drossbach. *Harmonie der Ergebnisse der Naturforschung.*

¹ Fundamental Truths, p. 125.

² Prin. of Psychology, Vol. I, pp. 159-160.

³ Principles of Psychol., Vol. II, p. 503.

"The ¹chief evidence of the soul's spirituality will be found to be, when inspected, intuition. . . . All the attributes of matter are absolutely irrelevant to spirit and to all of its modifications." . . . Ideas are impressed in it. "It is a substance that is simple monadic, indivisible, unextended and devoid of sensible attributes."—Dabney.

"The reality ² of the soul consists in its ability to act; other reality it has none. How the soul can act there is no telling. In thinking of the soul we must not look for a lump, nor for a category, nor for a picture, but for the agent which thinks and feels and wills, and knows itself in so doing. And this soul is neither in the heights nor in the depths; it is very nigh indeed, for it is simply the living self."

"The self-identification of the soul, then, is the best proof of identity, for identity has no other meaning."—Bowne.

As a constant ³ there is no immaterial soul substance; the existence of the soul consists in soul-life, —when one analyzes the psychic processes no residue remains. The soul-atom as substance is a survival of metaphysics.

The atom is the absolute constant of the material world, and as to quantity and quality unchangeable. All change is traced back to the arrangement and motion of the atom. If one carries this idea over to psychic life then one destroys the concept or the life. The soul is not unchangeable and constant like the atom, but constant transformation is its characteristic and as the atom may, the soul never returns to a former condition. So you cannot speak of the soul as substance in the sense of being atomic.—Paulsen.

"Man's soul ⁴ is a description of reality *sub specie aeterni*; it is an image of God. God enters, as it were, in parts with every sense-impression into sentient creatures, and his likeness grows in clearness as the traces thus produced in living feelings reconstruct the World-Logos, which in man's soul appears as the divine spark called Reason."—Carus.

We have now given a very incomplete résumé of ideas of the soul that may be classified as philosophical, they should be regarded, in some measure, as representative rather than a complete list. Certain lines of thought have been influential as determining the attitude philosophers have taken, as, for example, the standpoint of empiricism followed generally by English writers, and until recent years the domination of idealism in Germany. The point of departure is, to a large extent, the factor determining the significance a philosopher will at-

¹ Sensual Philosophy of the 19th Century, p. 142.

² Metaphysics, pp. 339 and 344.

³ Einleitung in die Philosophie.

⁴ The Surd of Metaphysics, p. 60.

tach as to the meaning of mind or soul. He has before him the problem to explain certain sets of facts, and to establish harmony among them. The most important of these facts are as follows: given the belief in an immortal part of the body, mind or soul, and the belief in a supreme being to establish a relationship that will be consistent with the universe as a whole. The kind of explanation depends upon the facts supposed to be known of each. Thus the philosophical conception of the soul presupposes a larger view of things than that of either theology or psychology alone.

The influence of the beginnings of science can be noted in the explanations given of mind at that time and the reactions to the church in such conceptions as are presented by Voltaire. Taking its impetus from Leibnitz the dynamic view of life, *i. e.*, as a development of some form, found favor with philosophers before Darwin presented his biological evidences in favor of it; the soul finding its perfection in God. Its spiritual nature is thus recognized by Lessing, Schelling, Hegel, and other idealists, similar in essence to the Absolute Being. For Schopenhauer it takes the form of will. Later writers have not contributed much. The philosophical conception, as based on the development of animal life has, perhaps, not yet been fully worked out.

From the developed sciences there will always be a search for laws and general principles; thus as new sciences are evolved there will continually be new elements of knowledge contributed toward what is considered the Absolute. These new elements will likewise be contributions to our knowledge of soul. The term soul is one too large for any one science, each contributes its part toward our knowledge of it.

[Continuation follows in the next number.]